动态博弈视角下适应水预算管理约束的企业自愿节水研究OA

To reveal the driving mechanism and equilibrium conditions for voluntary water conservation by high-water-consumption enterprises under the constraints of the water budget management,this study is set against the backdrop of the pilot water budget management program launched by the Ministry of Water Resources in 2024.Focusing on high-water-consumption enterprises not included in the water budget man-agement list,a dynamic game model is constructed incorporating three key variables:the probability of mandatory government inclusion(q),water conservation subsidies(S),and the shadow cost of public funds(α).The model derives the equilibrium conditions and incentive mechanisms for voluntary enterprise water conservation.The results show that:a)When q＞0,an equilibrium for voluntary water conservation exists,meaning that the deterrent effect of mandatory inclusion serves as an institutional prerequisite rather than merely a supplementary con-dition for the functioning of the mechanism.b)Enterprises without market power can achieve the water conservation level exceeding the opti-mal level under mandatory pathways,whereas enterprises with market power leverage their bargaining power to suppress the equilibrium water conservation level to the lower bound of the government's participation constraint,creating a double efficiency loss.c)Increasing q has a universally positive incentive effect on all types of enterprises.d)The incentive effectiveness of subsidies is constrained by both q and α,generating a subsidy efficiency discount effect.Based on these findings,three policy scenarios are identified:enforcement-led,incentive-compensation,and joint-intervention.These scenarios serve as a theoretical basis for establishing water conservation targets and precisely designing differentiated subsidies in the pilot water budget management program.