环境司法改革与企业杠杆操纵:来自环境法庭设立的证据OA
Environmental Judicial Reform and Corporate Leverage Manipulation:Evidence from the Establishment of Environmental Courts
虽然环境司法改革的初衷在于运用环境法治理念强化环境治理效能,但它也可能向利益相关者传递潜在的风险信号,进而诱发企业行为异化.本研究以环境法庭设立作为外生冲击,基于 2004~2023 年沪深 A 股重污染企业数据,采用多期双重差分法,系统考察环境司法改革对企业杠杆操纵的影响.结果表明,环境法庭的设立显著加剧了企业杠杆操纵,其核心机制在于强化了环境同构压力并引发了债务融资劣势.异质性分析显示,该加剧效应在企业环境风险较高、可抵押资产较少的情形下尤为突出.治理机制探索发现,在绿色补贴较为充足、绿色金融较为完善以及公司治理较为健全时,该效应受到抑制.经济后果分析表明,该加剧效应显著提升了企业债务违约风险与股价崩盘风险.溢出效应分析证实,该效应具有空间溢出性,邻近地区环境法庭的设立同样会加剧本地企业的杠杆操纵行为.研究结论从企业杠杆操纵视角揭示了环境司法改革的非预期效应,为司法部门优化环境司法改革以防范系统性金融风险、企业重构债务决策以管控隐性债务风险提供了理论支撑与实践启示.
Although the original intention of environmental judicial reform is to strengthen environmental governance by applying the concept of environmental rule of law,it may also send potential risk signals to stakeholders,thereby potentially leading to distorted corporate behavior.Taking the establishment of environmental courts as an exogenous shock,this paper systematically examines the impact of environmental judicial reform on corporate leverage manipulation using data from heavily polluting companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets from 2004 to 2023,employing a multi-period difference-in-differences approach.The results show that the establishment of environmental courts significantly exacerbates corporate leverage manipulation,with the core mechanism being the intensification of environmental homogeneity pressure and the emergence of debt financing disadvantages.Heterogeneity analysis indicates that this exacerbating effect is more pronounced when companies face higher environmental risks or have fewer collateralizable assets.Governance mechanism analysis reveals that this effect is mitigated when green subsidies are relatively sufficient,green finance is relatively well-developed,and corporate governance quality is relatively sound.Economic consequence analysis further shows that this effect significantly increases corporate debt default risk and stock price crash risk.Spillover effect analysis confirms that this effect exhibits spatial spillovers,meaning that the establishment of environmental courts in neighboring regions also exacerbates local corporate leverage manipulation behavior.These findings reveal the unintended consequences of environmental judicial reform from the perspective of corporate leverage manipulation,providing theoretical support and practical insights for judicial authorities to optimize environmental judicial reforms,prevent systemic financial risks,and for enterprises to improve their debt decisions to control implicit debt risks.
于连超;杨真真;乔若宸;李昭依;马宁
兰州大学 管理学院,兰州 730000兰州大学 管理学院,兰州 730000兰州大学 管理学院,兰州 730000大连理工大学 经济管理学院,辽宁 大连 116024兰州大学 管理学院,兰州 730000
管理科学
环境司法改革环境法庭杠杆操纵隐性债务风险溢出效应
environmental judicial reformenvironmental courtleverage manipulationimplicit debt riskspillover effect
《系统管理学报》 2026 (5)
1383-1402,20
国家自然科学基金青年项目(72302111)甘肃省软科学专项一般项目(26JRZA001)
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