从机制形成到监管重构:平台垄断的逻辑、效应与治理OACHSSCD

The platform economy,while unleashing significant efficiency dividends,has witnessed a rising frequency of monopolistic practices.The paradox that heavy penalties have failed to substantially weaken the market power of dominant platforms,highlights the disconnect between the traditional regulatory framework and the operational logic of platform economy.Following the analytical path of"core characteristics—formation mechanisms—behavioral manifestations—effect assessment—policy responses",this paper systematically reviews and appraises the latest research on platform monopoly and its governance,aiming to provide a theoretical reference for platform economy regulation. The core conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1)Platform monopoly results from the superposition of three logics—"techno-economic attributes","socio-political structures",and"institutional-policy environments".Network externalities and increasing returns to scale of data constitute endogenous momentum;the dual identity of platforms(as both market participant and rule-maker)and their quasi-infrastructure status endow them with dominance;regulatory lag and inter-jurisdictional externalities provide catalytic conditions.Corporate strategic behaviors and capital market expectations serve as activation mechanisms.(2)Platform monopolistic behaviors exhibit distinct stage-based evolutionary characteristics.During the market contestation stage,subsidies and exclusionary practices dominate;during the market dominance stage,exploitative abuses such as personalized pricing prevail;and during the ecosystem consolidation stage,killer acquisitions and architectural lock-in become prominent.The market structure exhibits a pattern of"hierarchical monopoly and competition",in which large platforms occupy dominant positions in the core layer and can unilaterally compress the competitive space in the peripheral layer.(3)The effects of monopoly are dualistic.Static efficiency is significantly improved,yet dynamic efficiency exhibits an inflection point;innovation incentives are released during the contestation stage but suppressed during the consolidation stage;welfare distribution is severely imbalanced,with monopoly rents being persistently amplified and spilling over into weakened gig-worker rights,employment polarization,and systemic financial risks. With respect to regulatory restructuring:(1)The traditional antitrust framework faces applicability crises in relevant market definition,market share presumption,and welfare standards,and the regulatory philosophy is shifting toward dynamic regulation based on the concept of error costs.(2)A differentiated regulatory toolbox has taken initial shape,ranging from ex ante preventive measures such as gatekeeper systems and data portability,to interim constraints such as algorithmic impact assessments,to ex post blocking measures such as merger review reforms.(3)Classified and tiered regulation,together with cross-regional coordination,constitute institutional underpinnings. The contributions of this paper are threefold:it integrates dispersed literature from industrial organization,political economy,and competition law,distilling the logical thread of"potential energy—leverage—catalysis";it refines the dynamic evolutionary and structural stratification characteristics of platform monopoly;and it systematically reviews regulatory institutional innovations in the Chinese context,offering a theoretical map for constructing a platform governance theory with Chinese characteristics.Future research urgently needs to make breakthroughs in areas such as dynamic quantification of regulatory error costs and updating methods for determining market dominance in the context of artificial intelligence.