美国技术出口管制下开源科技情报采集的合规困境与破局路径OACHSSCD

[Purpose]This paper addresses the dual dilemma faced by open source science and technology intelligence(OSINT)collection under the expansion of U.S.technology export controls,namely external access restrictions and internal compliance constraints.It analy-zes the multidimensional legal risks of foreign-related technology data acquisition and the limitations of China's blocking mechanisms in digital scenarios,with a view to providing a two-way compliant defense system and practical pathways for the lawful,secure and sustain-able acquisition of overseas core science and technology intelligence.[Method]From an interdisciplinary perspective combining law,in-formation resource management and computer science,this paper applies legal normative analysis and intelligence-source evaluation meth-ods to deconstruct compliance red lines in terms of U.S.Export Administration Regulations(EAR)controls over"technology"and source code,public-law long-arm jurisdiction,private-law Terms of Service(ToS)liability and domestic network-data security.It fur-ther examines the institutional mismatch and evidentiary difficulties of China's traditional economic and trade blocking legislation in intangi-ble data flows and high-frequency intelligence acquisition.[Result/Conclusion]The current blocking framework may place intelligence actors in a dual-compliance impasse in which"compliance means supply cut-off,while acquisition means violation".A coordinated mac-ro-meso-micro system is therefore required:statutory exemptions and compensation mechanisms for foreign-related science and technolo-gy intelligence at the macro level;a dynamic risk-rating model integrating domestic and foreign legal indicators at the meso level;and at the micro level,cautious deployment of privacy-enhancing technologies(PETs),including federated learning and secure multi-party computation,only within the boundaries of authorization,public availability or lawful exemption.Such technologies are not a means of e-vading export controls or platform agreements;rather,they function as compliance-oriented safeguards to enable"data usable but not visi-ble"joint analysis while resisting improper extraterritorial jurisdiction and protecting China's data-security baseline.