家庭农场雇工合约的缔结成本、履约风险与治理策略OACHSSCD
Transaction Costs,Contract Performance Risks,and Governance Strategies of Employment Contracts in Family Farms
基于契约经济学视角,系统分析中国家庭农场雇工合约的缔约成本构成、风险类型与差异化治理机制.研究表明:家庭农场雇工缔约成本涵盖预见、谈判、证实三种类型,主要面临雇工权益保障、非专业化、投机性及劳动冲突四类风险;生产性劳动宜采用固定工时制与作业承包制,技术性劳动宜采用利益深度绑定的绩效分成与风险共担机制,管理性劳动宜采用人力资本入股与信任机制;针对不同雇佣情境采用正式合约与关系型合约的功能互补与差异化治理模式.提出加强合约规范化管理、完善农业雇工制度与标准供给等建议.
From the perspective of contract economics,the composition of transaction costs,types of risks,and differentiated governance mechanisms of employment contracts in Chinese family farms were systematically analyzed.It was shown that the transaction costs of hiring labor in family farms covered three types:foreseeing,negotiating,and verifying.Four main types of risks were identified:lack of labor rights protection,non-professionalization,opportunistic behavior,and labor conflicts.For productive labor,fixed working hour and task-based contracting mechanisms were recommended;for technical labor,performance-based profit-sharing and risk-sharing mechanisms with deeply tied interests were recommended;for managerial labor,human capital equity participation and trust mechanisms were suggested.Complementary and differentiated governance models,combining formal contracts and relational contracts,should be adopted according to different employment contexts.Recommendations were proposed,including strengthening standardized contract management and improving the supply of agricultural employment institutions and standards.
陈军民
河南科技学院 经济与管理学院,河南新乡 453003
管理科学
家庭农场雇工合约缔约成本履约风险合约治理
family farmsemployment contractstransaction costscontract performance riskscontract governance
《沈阳大学学报(社会科学版)》 2026 (4)
15-23,9
河南省哲学社会科学规划项目(2025ZDI05)河南省科技厅软科学项目(262400410306).
评论