首页|期刊导航|沈阳大学学报(社会科学版)|多个大股东并存对商业银行系统性风险的影响及其作用机制

多个大股东并存对商业银行系统性风险的影响及其作用机制OACHSSCD

Impact of Coexistence of Multiple Large Shareholders on Systemic Risk of Commercial Banks and Its Mechanism

中文摘要英文摘要

以2010-2023年我国商业银行为研究对象,运用双向固定效应模型实证检验多个大股东并存对商业银行系统性风险的影响及其作用机制.研究发现,多个大股东并存会显著增加商业银行系统性风险.作用机制检验表明,多个大股东并存可通过提升其他大股东监督强度和降低银行流动性水平两个渠道增加商业银行的系统性风险;调节效应检验表明,当宏观审慎政策强度较高时,会削弱多个大股东并存对商业银行系统性风险的正向影响.异质性分析发现,多个大股东并存对商业银行系统性风险的正向作用在非系统重要性银行、大规模银行及低竞争程度银行中更为明显.基于此,提出强化多元股权结构银行内部治理监管、优化银行流动性管理与风险防控、发挥宏观审慎政策调节作用、推进差异化监管与精准施策等建议,以防范商业银行系统性风险,并提升银行体系稳健性.

Chinese commercial banks from 2010 to 2023 were taken as research objects,and a two-way fixed effects model was employed to empirically examine the impact of the coexistence of multiple large shareholders on commercial banks' systemic risk and its underlying mechanism.It was found that the coexistence of multiple large shareholders significantly increased the systemic risk of commercial banks.Mechanism tests revealed that the coexistence of multiple large shareholders elevated systemic risk mainly through two channels:enhancing monitoring intensity by other large shareholders and reducing bank liquidity.Moderating effect tests indicated that a higher intensity of macroprudential policies weakened the positive impact of the coexistence of multiple large shareholders on commercial banks' systemic risk.Heterogeneity analysis showed that the positive effect of the coexistence of multiple large shareholders on commercial banks' systemic risk was more pronounced in non-systemically important banks,large-scale banks,and banks operating in less competitive markets.Based on these findings,recommendations were proposed,including strengthening internal governance and supervision of banks with diversified ownership structures,optimizing liquidity management and risk prevention and control,leveraging the moderating role of macroprudential policies,and promoting differentiated supervision and targeted policy implementation so as to prevent systemic risk in commercial banks and enhance the stability of the banking system.

吴成颂;王小丫

安徽大学 商学院,安徽 合肥 230601安徽大学 商学院,安徽 合肥 230601

管理科学

多个大股东并存商业银行系统性风险大股东监督流动性水平宏观审慎政策

coexistence of multiple large shareholderscommercial banks' systemic risklarge shareholder supervisionliquidity levelmacroprudential policy

《沈阳大学学报(社会科学版)》 2026 (4)

1-14,14

国家社会科学基金资助项目(24BGL061).

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