考虑低碳激励的运营商-数据中心群主从博弈调度策略OA
A Stackelberg game-based scheduling strategy for operator-data center clusters considering low-carbon incentives
在"双碳"目标与数字经济高质量发展的双重战略牵引下,数据中心群规模持续扩大,其高强度用能带来的运行成本、碳排放及多主体收益分配矛盾日益突出,现有运行方式难以兼顾经济性与低碳性.针对上述问题,提出一种考虑低碳激励的综合能源运营商-数据中心群Stackelberg主从博弈调度方法.建立计及燃气发电单元、燃气锅炉、吸收式制冷机、热泵及风电、光伏新能源的冷-热-电多能耦合模型,描述数据中心内部能源转换、新能源消纳及运行关系.构建以综合能源运营商为领导者、数据中心群为跟随者的Stackelberg主从博弈模型.运营商根据上级能源价格和低碳运行需求制定电价、气价及低碳激励策略,各数据中心在满足能量平衡和设备运行约束的基础上独立求解最优响应,自主调整用能方式.引入基于实际有效减排量的外部低碳补偿机制,以缓解运营商实施低碳激励所带来的收益压力.以运营商收益、数据中心群净运行成本和系统碳排放量为3个上层优化目标,采用基于分解的多目标进化算法搜索满足数据中心最优响应约束的Pareto非支配策略集,并从中选取综合折中方案.算例结果表明,所提方法能够有效协调运营商收益、数据中心运行成本与系统减碳目标.与基准场景相比,文中博弈机制下数据中心群净运行成本降低3.49%,系统碳排放降低1.96%;相比仅考虑内部低碳激励的场景,引入外部低碳补偿后运营商收益提高7.41%.研究结果表明,所提方法能够在保持数据中心自主响应的同时兼顾多主体经济性与低碳性,为数据中心群综合能源优化调度及低碳协同运行提供参考.
Driven by the dual strategic objectives of achieving the"dual carbon"goals and promoting high-quality development of the digital economy,data center clusters continue to expand in scale.The intensive energy consumption of data centers has increasingly intensified conflicts involving operating costs,carbon emissions,and benefit allocation among multiple stakeholders,and existing operation modes can hardly balance economic efficiency and low-carbon performance.To address these issues,a Stackelberg leader-follower scheduling method for an integrated energy operator and data center cluster considering low-carbon incentives was proposed.A coupled cooling-heating-electricity model incorporating gas-fired power generation units,gas boilers,absorption chillers,heat pumps,wind power,and photovoltaic generation was established to characterize multi-energy conversion,renewable energy utilization,and operational relationships within data centers.Then,a Stackelberg game model was constructed with the integrated energy operator as the leader and the data center cluster as the follower.The operator determined electricity prices,gas prices,and low-carbon incentive strategies based on upstream energy prices and low-carbon operation requirements.Each data center independently solved for its optimal response subject to energy balance and equipment operation constraints,and autonomously adjusted its energy consumption patterns.On this basis,an external low-carbon compensation mechanism based on actual effective emission reductions was introduced to alleviate the profit pressure faced by the operator from providing low-carbon incentives.Furthermore,maximizing operator profit,minimizing the net operating cost of the data center cluster,and minimizing system carbon emissions were formulated as the three upper-level optimization objectives.The multi-objective evolutionary algorithm based on decomposition was employed to search for a Pareto non-dominated strategy set subject to the optimal-response constraints of the data centers,from which a compromise scheduling solution was selected.Case study results demonstrated that the proposed method could effectively coordinate operator profit,data center operating costs,and system carbon emission reduction objectives.Compared with the baseline scenario,the proposed game mechanism reduced the net operating cost of the data center cluster by 3.49%and system carbon emissions by 1.96%.Compared with the scenario considering only internal low-carbon incentives,the introduction of external low-carbon compensation increased operator profit by 7.41%.The findings indicate that the proposed method can balance the economic efficiency and low-carbon performance of multiple stakeholders while maintaining the autonomous response capability of data centers,thereby providing a reference for integrated energy optimization scheduling and low-carbon coordinated operation of data center clusters.
龚钢军;宋得山;陈昭赫;柴凯天;杨佳轩
华北电力大学 电气与电子工程学院,北京 102206华北电力大学 电气与电子工程学院,北京 102206华北电力大学 电气与电子工程学院,北京 102206||中电信数智科技有限公司,北京 100036华北电力大学 电气与电子工程学院,北京 102206华北电力大学 电气与电子工程学院,北京 102206
能源科技
数据中心综合能源运营商Stackelberg博弈基于分解的多目标进化算法低碳激励算电协同
data centerintegrated energy operatorStackelberg gamemulti-objective evolutionary algorithm based on decompositionlow-carbon incentivecomputing-electricity coordination
《综合智慧能源》 2026 (8)
82-95,14
国家电网有限公司科技项目(2025YF-120)国家自然科学基金项目(52477095)Science and Technology Project of State Grid Corporation of China(2025YF-120)National Natural Science Foundation of China(52477095)
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