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低空经济背景下物流体系的三方演化博弈OA

Evolutionary Game of Three Parties in Logistics System under Low-Altitude Economy

中文摘要英文摘要

针对低空经济背景下无人机配送市场中企业违规运营、政府监管乏力与公众监督缺位等治理困境,构建了无人机配送企业、政府监管部门与公众的三方演化博弈模型.通过复制动态方程与雅可比矩阵稳定性分析,揭示了三方策略选择的演化路径与稳定条件,并结合数值仿真考察了关键参数对系统收敛的影响.研究发现:1)政府严格监管的初始概率与企业合规运营的收敛速度呈正相关,但与公众监督的收敛速度呈负相关,单一依赖政府监管将削弱公众参与动力;2)公众监督成本存在阈值效应(阈值范围为5~6),当监督成本低于该阈值时系统趋向于三方共赢的理想状态,反之则公众退出监督;3)单一提高罚款强度会加剧公众监督的"搭便车"行为,罚款机制需与激励措施协同配合方能发挥政策合力.研究建议建立政府-公众协同监督网络、降低公众监督成本、完善"罚款+激励"组合政策,为低空经济物流市场的监管政策制定提供量化决策参考.

To address governance dilemmas in the drone delivery market under the low-altitude economy-including illegal operations by enterprises,weak government regulation,and absence of public supervision-a tripartite evolutionary game model involving drone delivery enterprises,government regulatory departments,and public consumers was constructed.Through replication dynamic equations and Jacobian matrix stability analysis,the evolutionary paths and stability conditions of the three parties' strategy choices were revealed,and numerical simulations were conducted to examine the effects of key parameters on system convergence.The findings indicated that:1)The initial probability of strict government regulation was positively correlated with the convergence speed of corporate compliance operations,but negatively correlated with the convergence speed of public supervision;sole reliance on government regulation weakened public participation incentives.2)A threshold effect was observed for public supervision cost(threshold range of 5~6).When the supervision cost fell below this threshold,the system converged to an ideal win-win-win state;otherwise,the public withdrew from supervision.3)Increasing the penalty intensity alone exacerbated free-riding behavior in public supervision;the penalty mechanism needed to be coordinated with incentive measures to achieve policy synergy.It was suggested that a government-public collaborative supervision network should be established,public supervision costs should be reduced,and a combined"penalty+incentive"policy should be improved,providing quantitative decision-making references for regulatory policy formulation in the low-altitude economy logistics market.

王丹;伊含笑;赵嘉琪

沈阳大学装备制造综合自动化重点实验室,辽宁 沈阳 110044沈阳大学装备制造综合自动化重点实验室,辽宁 沈阳 110044沈阳大学装备制造综合自动化重点实验室,辽宁 沈阳 110044

管理科学

无人机物流演化博弈低空经济政府监管稳定性分析

drone logisticsevolutionary gamelow-altitude economygovernment regulationstability analysis

《沈阳大学学报(自然科学版)》 2026 (4)

297-304,8

国家自然科学基金面上项目(62273191).

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