考虑智选与续航努力的新能源汽车供应链协调研究OACHSSCD

Aiming at the issue of insufficient incentive for intelligent selection effort among suppliers in the new energy vehicle supply chain,this study focuses on a two-tier supply chain composed of an intelligent selection supplier and a new energy vehicle manufacturer.Constructing the Stackelberg game model,it analyzes the optimal intelligent selection effort,optimal driving range effort,and the optimal profits of supply chain members under decentralized decision-making where the supplier leads and is responsible for sales,centralized decision-making and cost-sharing contract decision-making.The research findings indicate that under different decision-making,the optimal intelligent selection effort,optimal driving range effort,and the optimal profits of supply chain members are positively correlated with consumers'intelligence concern and driving range concern.Within a certain cost-sharing ratio range,cost-sharing contract can achieve Pareto improvement in the new energy vehicle supply chain.The conclusions provide insights for enhancing consumers'intelligence and driving range concern regarding new energy vehicles,guiding supply chain members to increase investment in intelligent selection research and development,and promoting the sustained and healthy development of the new energy vehicle industry.