首页|期刊导航|辽宁工程技术大学学报(社会科学版)|高管内部薪酬差距、企业风险承担水平与投资效率

高管内部薪酬差距、企业风险承担水平与投资效率OACHSSCD

Executive internal pay gap,corporate risk-taking level,and investment efficiency

中文摘要英文摘要

针对高管内部薪酬差距、企业风险承担水平与投资效率之间的关系问题,以2008-2022年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,采用实证研究的方法,分析高管内部薪酬差距对投资效率的影响及作用机制.研究表明:高管内部薪酬差距越大,投资效率越高;高管内部薪酬差距与企业风险承担水平正相关;企业风险承担水平在高管内部薪酬差距与投资效率之间发挥中介作用;高管内部薪酬差距对企业风险承担水平的影响在环境不确定性较高企业以及非国有企业中更显著.研究结论为进一步发挥高管内部薪酬差距在企业投资决策中的激励作用、助力企业提高投资效率提供参考.

Regarding the relationship between executive internal pay gap,corporate risk-taking level and investment efficiency,this paper takes A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2008 to 2022 as research samples and adopts an empirical method to explore the influence and underlying mechanism of executive internal pay gap on corporate investment efficiency.The results show that a larger executive internal pay gap is significantly associated with higher investment efficiency;the executive internal pay gap is positively correlated with corporate risk-taking level.Corporate risk-taking level plays a mediating role between executive internal pay gap and investment efficiency.The positive effect of executive internal pay gap on corporate risk-taking level is more pronounced in firms with higher environmental uncertainty and non-state-owned enterprises.The research conclusion provides a reference for giving full play to the incentive effect of executive internal pay gap in corporate investment decision-making and promoting the improvement of corporate investment efficiency.

金静;朱浩宇;汪燕敏

安徽财经大学 会计学院,安徽 蚌埠 233030安徽财经大学 会计学院,安徽 蚌埠 233030安徽财经大学 统计与应用数学学院,安徽 蚌埠 233030

管理科学

高管内部薪酬差距企业风险承担水平投资效率代理成本激励机制

executive internal pay gapcorporate risk-taking levelinvestment efficiencyagency costincentive mechanism

《辽宁工程技术大学学报(社会科学版)》 2026 (5)

345-352,8

安徽省高校人文社会科学研究项目(2022AH050572)

10.27031/j.cnki.1008-391X.20260011

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