政府奖惩下ESG披露履责与寻租的三方演化博弈:基于物流行业的研究OA
Tripartite Evolutionary Game of ESG Disclosure,Responsibility Fulfillment,and Rent-Seeking under Government Incentives and Sanctions:A Study Based on the Logistics Industry
在"双碳"目标和可持续发展治理推进下,ESG 信息披露已成为衡量企业绿色发展的重要依据.制度尚不健全阶段,物流服务供应商面临履责压力与合规成本的权衡,部分企业通过寻租获取虚高评级,干扰治理秩序.本文围绕物流服务供应商、ESG 评级机构与政府三方,构建"绿色运输—评级寻租—政策规制"演化博弈模型,基于有限理性与信息不对称,分析策略演化路径与系统稳定性,并借助 Matlab 进行数值仿真.结果表明,适度奖惩机制有助于引导合规行为,推动系统向理想均衡演化;但激励过强则可能引发扰动.各方策略受净收益与监管成本约束,应优化激励机制与成本收益结构,为完善ESG 治理体系和提升绿色治理效能提供理论依据.
Under the"dual-carbon"goal and the promotion of sustainable development governance,ESG disclosure has be-come an important basis for measuring the green development of enterprises.At the stage when the system is not yet sound,logistics service providers face the pressure of responsibility fulfillment and compliance cost trade-off,and some enterprises seek rent to ob-tain inflated ratings,which interferes with the governance order.This paper focuses on the three parties:logistics service suppliers,ESG rating agencies,and the government,constructs a"green transportation-rating rent-seeking-policy regulation"evolutionary game model,analyzes the strategy evolution path and system stability based on limited rationality and information asymmetry,and conducts numerical simulation using Matlab.The results show that moderate incentives and penalties help guide compliance behav-ior and promote the evolution of the system to an ideal equilibrium,while excessive incentives may cause disturbances.The strate-gies of each party are constrained by net benefits and regulatory costs,and the incentive mechanism and cost-benefit structure should be optimized to provide a theoretical basis for improving the ESG governance system and enhancing the effectiveness of green governance.
张瀚文;陈穆;孙华阳
湖北汽车工业学院 汽车商学院,湖北 十堰 442002湖北汽车工业学院 汽车商学院,湖北 十堰 442002||南平市武夷新区贸易投资有限公司 贸易业务部,福建 南平 354200锦州医科大学 健康管理学院,辽宁 锦州 121001
管理科学
ESG信息披露演化博弈绿色治理寻租行为制度设计
ESG disclosureevolutionary gamegreen governancerent-seeking behaviorinstitutional design
《荆楚理工学院学报》 2026 (4)
68-79,12
辽宁省科学技术协会创新智库项目(LNKX2025QN33)
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