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新任独董更易加剧高管违规吗OA

Do New Independent Directors Tend to Exacerbate executive Violations?

中文摘要英文摘要

独立董事的监督属于公司治理结构中的核心环节,新任独董的独立性、专业性和客观性的发挥具有不可替代的作用.选取 2011-2023 年我国沪深A 股上市公司数据,通过建立 Probit和 OLS 模型探究新任独董对高管违规的影响.结果表明:新任独董更有可能加剧高管违规风险;新任独董通过降低公司信息透明度、减少异议次数,进而增加高管违规的可能性.当新任董事具有法律背景且不忙碌时,新任独董更易降低高管违规风险.据此,公司应当加强信息透明度,完善治理结构,激励新任独董任职的主动性.

The supervision of independent directors is a core component of corporate governance structure,and the indepen-dence,professionalism,and objectivity of new independent directors play an irreplaceable role.This study selects data from A-share listed companies in China from 2011 to 2023,and explores the impact of new independent directors on executive violations by establishing Probit and OLS models.The results show that:new independent directors increase the likelihood of executive viola-tions;new independent directors enhance the possibility of executive violations by reducing corporate information transparency and decreasing the number of dissent votes;when new independent directors have a legal background and are not overburdened,they are more likely to reduce the risk of executive violations.Based on this,enterprises should strengthen information transparency,im-prove governance structures,and incentivize the initiative of new independent directors in their roles.

陈高才;王涵瑜

安徽大学 商学院,安徽 合肥 230601安徽大学 商学院,安徽 合肥 230601

管理科学

新任独董高管违规信息透明度薪酬激励

new independent directorsexecutive violationsinformation transparencycompensation incentives

《荆楚理工学院学报》 2026 (4)

41-56,16

安徽省哲学社会科学规划项目研究成果全周期视域下公司新任独董的选任、履职和治理效果研究(项目批准号:AHSKYY2024D010)

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