电商平台"内卷式"竞争的市场规制法进路OACHSSCD
Market Regulation Law Approaches to"Involution"Competition Among E-commerce Platforms
电商平台"内卷式"竞争已成为平台经济治理的核心问题,其表现主要包括价格维度的挤压性定价与自动改价,以及非价格维度的沉浸式设计与注意力榨取等策略.其形成机制可归因于供给侧、需求侧与公益侧的协同作用:在供给侧,平台通过制造数据依赖性、构筑结构性壁垒并强化经济从属性,对经营者施加"硬性控制";在需求侧,利用损失厌恶、从众心理等认知偏差对消费者实施"软性控制";在公益侧,地方政府政策倾斜进一步强化平台主导的"内卷式"竞争.这些机制的交互作用,使竞争形式看似表面强化,实质却较为扭曲,对经营者利益、消费者利益及社会公共利益造成系统性损害.为矫正这种制度性失衡,需依托市场规制法体系开展协同治理:在市场交易秩序规制层面,消费者权益保护法、电子商务法和价格法分别修复权利配置、规则制定与价格机制的制度性失衡;在市场竞争秩序规制层面,反不正当竞争法、反垄断法及公平竞争审查制度规范非价格操纵与结构性竞争失灵,并从政策源头防止内卷加剧.通过多层次、差异化的协同介入,可系统性修复竞争机制,推动平台经济向良性、可持续发展转型.
"Involution"competition among e-commerce platforms has emerged as a central issue in the governance of the platform economy.Its primary manifestations include price squeezing and automated price adjustments in the price dimension,as well as immersive design and attention extraction strategies in the non-price dimension.The formation of such competition can be attributed to the combined effects of supply-side,demand-side,and public-interest dynamics.On the supply side,platforms impose"hard control"over merchants by creating data dependency,constructing structural barriers,and reinforcing economic subordination.On the demand side,platforms exercise"soft control"over consumers by exploiting cognitive biases such as loss aversion and herd behavior.On the public-interest side,policy preferences of local governments may further reinforce platform-dominated"involution"competition.Through the interaction of these mechanisms,competition appears intensified but distorted substantially,generating systemic harms to merchants,consumers,and the broader public interest.To correct this institutional imbalance,a coordinated governance approach within the framework of market regulation law is required.At the level of regulating market transaction order,the Consumer Rights Protection Law,the E-commerce Law,and the Price Law can respectively address institutional imbalances in rights allocation,rule-making,and pricing mechanisms.At the level of regulating market competition order,the Anti-Unfair Competition Law,the Antitrust Law,and the Fair Competition Review Mechanism can curb non-price manipulation and structural competition failures,while preventing the intensification of"involution"competition at the policy level.Through multi-level and differentiated regulatory intervention,the competitive mechanism can be systematically restored,facilitating the transition of the platform economy toward a healthier and more sustainable development trajectory.
丁庭威
北京大学 法学院,北京 100871
社会科学
电商平台"内卷式"竞争市场规制法交易秩序规制竞争秩序规制协同治理
e-commerce platforms"involution"competitionmarket regulation lawregulation of market transaction orderregulation of market competition ordercoordinated governance
《北京工业大学学报(社会科学版)》 2026 (5)
111-127,17
司法部法治建设与法学理论研究部级科研项目(25SFB3029)
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