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数字化治理下农产品区域公用品牌发展的三方演化博弈分析OA

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Development of Regional Public Brands for Agricultural Products Under Digital Governance

中文摘要英文摘要

当前在乡村全面振兴背景下,农产品区域公用品牌建设对我国农业高质量发展发挥着重要作用.文章构建政府、农民合作社和消费者三方演化博弈模型,聚焦农民合作社"搭便车"、消费者参与积极性不高等现实难题,通过仿真模拟数字化治理监管、激励机制等不同实施场景下各主体的策略演化规律,探究农产品区域公用品牌可持续发展的最优治理路径,并以"泗水地瓜"区域公用品牌建设案例进行验证.结果表明:通过三方演化博弈模型开展动态调整及稳定性分析可以发现,政府实施监管、农民合作社开展规范生产、消费者主动参与反馈,是农产品区域公用品牌治理的最优稳定均衡策略,唯有三方协同联动,才能推动区域公用品牌实现长效健康发展;仿真模型结果进一步表明,仅微调单一参数难以扭转农民合作社短期投机经营倾向,只有综合优化补贴激励、违规处罚、消费者反馈成本、区域公用品牌综合效益等多项关键参数,才能引导博弈系统脱离非理想均衡状态,推动各主体策略向协同治理方向演化;"泗水地瓜"区域公用品牌建设的实际治理案例,充分验证了上述仿真结论在现实场景中的适用性.据此,提出完善政府数字化监管机制、加快农民合作社数字化转型、引导消费者参与监督与传播、依托数字化平台搭建多方协同治理闭环等对策,为农产品区域公用品牌高质量发展提供参考.

Against the backdrop of all-around rural revitalization,the development of regional public brands for agricultural products plays a vital role in the high-quality development of China's agriculture.This paper constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government,farmers' cooperatives and consumers.Focusing on practical governance dilemmas such as the"free-riding behavior"of farmers' cooperatives and low consumer participation enthusiasm,this study simulated the strategy evolution rules of each stakeholder under different implementation scenarios of digital governance supervision and incentive mechanisms.Then,the study conducted an empirical verification to explore the optimal governance path for the sustainable development of regional public brands for agricultural products using the case of"Sishui Sweet Potato".The results showed that:government supervision,standardized production by farmers' cooperatives and active feedback from consumers constituted the optimal stable equilibrium strategy for governance of regional public brands for agricultural products.Only the coordinated linkage of the three parties could promote the long-term and healthy development of regional public agricultural brands.Further simulation results indicated that fine-tuning a single parameter was hardly able to reverse the short-term speculative operation tendency of farmers' cooperatives.Only by comprehensively optimizing key parameters,including subsidy incentives,penalties for violations,consumer feedback costs,and the comprehensive benefits of regional public brands,could the game system be guided out of the sub-optimal equilibrium state and push stakeholders to evolve toward collaborative governance.The actual governance practice of regional public brands"Sishui Sweet Potato"fully verified the applicability of the above simulation conclusions in real-world scenarios.Accordingly,targeted countermeasures are proposed,including improving the government's digital supervision mechanism,accelerating the digital transformation of farmers' cooperatives,guiding consumers to participate in supervision and communication,and building a multi-party collaborative governance closed-loop via digital platforms,in order to provide references for the high-quality development of regional public brands for agricultural products.

吴灿;张志

山东农业大学 经济管理学院,山东 泰安 271018山东农业大学 经济管理学院,山东 泰安 271018

管理科学

农产品区域公用品牌数字化治理演化博弈模型仿真模拟分析

regional public brands for agricultural productsdigital governanceevolutionary game modelsimulation analysis

《现代农业》 2026 (4)

64-81,18

国家社会科学基金青年项目"重点帮扶县乡村'土特产'联农带农的机制与路径研究"(25CGL103)山东省第五次全国经济普查投入产出调查研究课题"基于投入产出表的山东农业生产性服务业发展研究"(TRCCA26).

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