首页|期刊导航|天津农业科学|农户自愿参与视角下休耕补偿激励政策的困境识别及改进路径

农户自愿参与视角下休耕补偿激励政策的困境识别及改进路径OA

Dilemma Identification and Improvement Paths of Fallow Compensation Incentive Policy from the Per-spective of Farmers'Voluntary Participation

中文摘要英文摘要

耕地轮作休耕制度是我国落实"藏粮于地、藏粮于技"战略的重要制度安排.农户自愿参与休耕是破解政府休耕财政压力的重要途径.本文运用规范分析方法,从补偿标准、补偿模式、补偿期限、补偿监管 4 个维度出发,识别现有休耕政策存在补偿标准偏离机会成本导致激励"不足"、补偿模式同质化致使激励"错位"、补偿期限刚性固化造成适应性不足、补偿监管手段单一的现实困境.基于农户自愿参与视角,从制定动态调整的补偿标准、推行差异化补偿模式、建立适应性的弹性补偿期限、构建多元共治的补偿监管体系 4 个维度,提出破解补偿激励"不足"与"错位"困境的改进思路,助力提升农户自愿参与度,推动休耕政策落实见效,为完善休耕补偿制度和促进耕地可持续利用提供实践参考.

The crop rotation and fallow system is an important institutional arrangement for implementing China's"storing grain in land and technology"strategy.Farmers'voluntary fallow participation serves as a crucial pathway to alleviate government fiscal pressure on fallow programs.Employing normative analysis,this paper identified practical dilemmas in existing fallow policies from four dimen-sions:compensation standards,compensation models,compensation duration,and compensation supervision.Specifically,compensation standards deviated from opportunity costs,resulting in incentive"insufficiency";the homogenization of compensation models led to in-centive"misalignment";the rigidity of compensation duration caused adaptive deficiency;and compensation supervision relied on sin-gular approaches.From the perspective of farmers'voluntary participation,this study proposed improvement strategies to address in-centive"insufficiency"and"misalignment"dilemmas:formulating dynamically adjusted compensation standards,implementing differ-entiated compensation models,establishing adaptive flexible compensation duration,and constructing a multi-stakeholder co-gover-nance compensation supervision system.These recommendations provide practical references for boosting farmers'voluntary participa-tion,ensuring effective implementation of fallow land policy,improving fallow compensation institutions and promoting sustainable cropland development.

王昕;李方丽

天津商业大学 经济学院,天津 300134天津商业大学 经济学院,天津 300134

管理科学

休耕补偿激励政策农户自愿参与禀赋异质性

fallow compensationincentive policyfarmers'voluntary participationendowment heterogeneity

《天津农业科学》 2026 (8)

65-68,4

教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(21YJC630136)

10.3969/j.issn.1006-6500.2026.08.009

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