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"一肩挑"村干部选拔中民意推荐与组织审核的现实张力OA

The practical tensions between public opinion recommendation and organizational review in the selection of village cadres under the"concurrent post"policy:A case study of practical experience in H City,Q Province

中文摘要英文摘要

[目的]全面推行村党组织书记、村委会主任"一肩挑"制度背景下,村干部选拔形成"民意推荐+组织审核"双重运行机制.厘清两类选拔环节之间张力的现实表征、生成逻辑与优化路径具有重要理论和现实意义.[方法]文章选取H市42名县乡治理干部、在职村干部与村民代表开展半结构化访谈,依托相关政策文件及地方实施细则构建制度分析框架,从制度根源、传导机制、认知基础和程序规范4个维度系统解析张力形成机理.[结果](1)张力产生的底层诱因是基层民主自治目标与行政治理效能目标的结构性矛盾,压力型体制逐级传导后,催生乡镇层面倾向选拔"可控型"村干部的行政偏好;(2)乡土熟人社会行动逻辑与科层行政选拔逻辑存在认知鸿沟,两套评价体系持续碰撞,维持民意推荐与组织审核之间的持续性张力;(3)民意推荐与组织审核的衔接性制度规范供给不足,异议处理、人选复核、矛盾协调等配套机制不完善,容易将潜在分歧转化为显性治理冲突.多重诱因相互耦合、循环强化形成自洽闭环,使得选拔张力在每一轮村级换届中反复显现.[结论]面向张力形成链条中的关键节点,需要构建双重目标动态平衡机制,建立融合乡土群众认可与行政绩效评价的复合型选拔标准,补齐程序规范短板以阻断矛盾放大路径;同时依托换届成效评估、业务案例培训、常态化年度研判等长效治理手段打破循环闭环,在基层群众自治与基层治理效能之间构筑可持续的动态平衡.

[Purpose]Against the backdrop of the full implementation of the system where village Party branch secretaries concurrently hold the post of village committee directors(the"dual-post system"),a dual mechanism of public opinion recommendation and organizational review has been adopted for village cadre selection.Clarifying the realistic representation,generation logic,and optimization path of the tension between the two types of selection processes has important theoretical and practical significance.[Method]Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 42 county and township administrators,incumbent village cadres,and villager representatives from City H.Relying on relevant policy documents and local implementation rules,this study constructed an institutional analytical framework to systematically unpack the formative mechanism of the aforementioned tensions across four dimensions:institutional roots,transmission mechanisms,cognitive foundations and procedural norms.[Result](1)The fundamental driver of such tensions was the structural conflict between grassroots mass self-governance and administrative governance efficiency.Under the tiered transmission of the pressure-based bureaucratic system,towns and townships developed an institutional bias toward recruiting"controllable"village cadres.(2)A cognitive divide existed between the behavioral logic of rural acquaintance societies and the selection logic of hierarchical administration.The constant collision of these two evaluation systems perpetuated persistent frictions between public opinion recommendation and organizational review.(3)Interim institutional rules linking the two procedures remained inadequate,with flawed supporting mechanisms for objection settlement,candidate re-examination and conflict mediation.Such defects readily turned latent disagreements into overt governance conflicts.Multiple causal factors interlocked and reinforced one another to form a self-reinforcing closed loop,which recreated selection tensions in every village committee election cycle.[Conclusion]To address critical links in the tension-generating chain,policymakers should establish a dynamic balancing mechanism for dual governance goals and formulate composite selection criteria that combine grassroots public recognition with administrative performance assessment.Complementary procedural rules should also be refined to block channels of conflict escalation.Furthermore,long-term governance measures including post-election evaluation,standardized case training and annual institutional reviews should be deployed to break the self-amplifying loop,thereby fostering sustainable dynamic equilibrium between grassroots mass autonomy and grassroots governance efficiency.

熊玲;南德庆

青海民族大学政治与公共管理学院,西宁 810007青海民族大学政治与公共管理学院,西宁 810007

一肩挑村干部选拔民意推荐组织审核现实张力

concurrent postvillage cadre selectionpublic opinion recommendationorganizational reviewpractical tensions

《中国农业信息》 2026 (2)

113-124,12

10.12105/j.issn.1672-0423.20260208

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