首页|期刊导航|证券市场导报|强制退市溢出效应研究:基于股价同步性的视角

强制退市溢出效应研究:基于股价同步性的视角OACHSSCD

中文摘要英文摘要

在出清风险公司的基础上,常态化退市机制能否改善资本市场信息效率,是评估退市制度改革效果需要回答的重要问题.本文以沪深A股上市公司为样本,构建多时点双重差分模型,研究发现公司强制退市显著降低了同行其他公司的股价同步性.机制检验表明,强制退市一方面通过监管威慑、市场竞争和外部监督,促使同行公司提升信息披露质量;另一方面通过释放行业风险信号,增强投资者关注,促使其搜集同行公司特质信息,从而推动更多特质信息融入股价.进一步研究发现,在退市公司规模较大、同行公司内部控制质量较低或媒体关注度较高时,上述效应更为显著.交易类、财务类以及重大违法类强制退市均显著降低了同行公司股价同步性,规范类强制退市的影响暂不明显.本文从行业溢出视角拓展了强制退市的经济后果研究,为完善常态化退市机制提供了经验证据.

On the basis of clearing risky companies,whether the normalized delisting mechanism can improve the information efficiency of the capital market is an important question that needs to be answered in evaluating the effectiveness of delisting system reform.Using a sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies,this paper constructs a multi-time point difference-in-differences model and finds that corporate mandatory delisting significantly reduces the stock price synchronicity of peer companies.Mechanism tests indicate that,on the one hand,mandatory delisting prompts peer companies to improve their information disclosure quality through regulatory deterrence,market competition,and external supervision;on the other hand,by releasing industry risk signals,it enhances investor attention and prompts investors to collect firm-specific information of peer companies,thereby incorporating more firm-specific information into stock prices.Further analyses find that the above effects are more significant when delisted companies are larger in size,peer companies exhibit lower internal control quality,or media attention is higher.Trading-related,financial-related,and major-violation-related mandatory delistings all significantly reduce the stock price synchronicity of peer companies,while the impact of compliance-related mandatory delisting remains insignificant.This paper extends research on the economic consequences of mandatory delisting from the perspective of industry spillover and provides empirical evidence for improving the normalized delisting mechanism.

刘梦童;武立东

南开大学中国公司治理研究院,天津 300071||南开大学商学院,天津 300071南开大学中国公司治理研究院,天津 300071||南开大学商学院,天津 300071

管理科学

强制退市股价同步性溢出效应信息披露质量

mandatory delistingstock price synchronicityspillover effectinformation disclosure quality

《证券市场导报》 2026 (8)

59-69,11

教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目"国有平台企业治理研究:多重逻辑与协同治理"(批准号:22JJD630004)、国家社会科学基金重大项目"新《公司法》下国有企业现代公司治理理论与实践问题研究"(批准号:24&ZD084)

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