特朗普第二任期情报团队内部工作分歧及其影响OACHSSCD

[Purpose]This article examines the main manifestations,mechanisms,and policy implications of internal working differences within Trump's second-term intelligence team.It seeks to explain why intra-elite competition persisted after high-level appointments had been largely reshaped around political loyalty,and how such competition has affected the U.S.policy outputs toward China,Russia,and Iran.[Method]Building on previous studies of president-intelligence relations during Trump's first term,Trump-era intelligence re-form,and bureaucratic politics,this article analyzes the 2025 and 2026 Annual Threat Assessments of the U.S.Intelligence Community,congressional hearing materials,and major English-language media reports to examine competition over authority,differences in profes-sional judgment,and variation in policy instruments within Trump's second-term intelligence team.[Result/Conclusion]This article finds that the principal contradiction within the intelligence system in Trump's second term no longer primarily takes the form of open con-frontation between the president and the established intelligence bureaucracy.Instead,it is increasingly manifested in competition among loyalist senior officials over authority,threat prioritization,professional boundaries,and policy instruments.Rather than producing a hom-ogeneous and frictionless"loyal team",Trump's second term has generated a form of bureaucratic politics under conditions of loyalist con-solidation.On China,the differences appear as competition over pathways under a broad consensus on toughness;on Russia,they are re-flected mainly in the downplaying of threats and in struggles over interpretive authority;on Iran,they take the form of an open collision between professional assessment and the president's war narrative.These differences have already affected the public presentation of intelli-gence assessments,cross-agency coordination,and the stability of U.S.external policy signaling.