天然气价格倒挂下的隐性交叉补贴机制与财务风险研究OACHSSCD

Under the constraints of incomplete pass-through of residential gas costs,some cities have gradually developed an implicit cross-subsidy mechanism,whereby profits from higher-priced non-residential gas sales are used to offset losses from residential gas supply.This paper conducts comparative case analyses of such six cities as Fuzhou,Shenzhen,Nanjing,Hangzhou,Wenzhou,and Jiaxing.The results show that Shenzhen and Nanjing have provided local gas suppliers with greater flexibility in adjusting non-residential gas prices,thereby supporting the sustainability of implicit cross-subsidies.Fuzhou gas company carried out a linkage based adjustment on residential gas prices in 2024 and achieved sound cost control with low-cost natural gas supplied under long-term contracts from Indonesia.Wenzhou also introduced a residential gas price linkage mechanism and maintained a reasonable gross profit margin in 2025,benefiting from its low gas distribution tariff of only RMB 0.58 per cubic meter.Although Jiaxing has a favorable gas consumption structure,with residential gas accounting for less than 20%of total gas sales,delayed residential gas price adjustments resulted in a situation of increasing revenue without corresponding profit growth in 2024.In contrast,Hangzhou encounters acute price-cost inversion due to the price ceiling imposed on non-residential gas,a decade long freeze on residential gas rates and residential gas consumption accounting for far more than 50 percent of its total gas deliveries.It reveals the passive formation mechanism and failure conditions of implicit cross-subsidies,systematically analyzes financial risks arising from price-cost inversion,and puts forward some policy recommendations.