"国家队"持股与企业环保违规OACHSSCD
"National Team"Shareholding and Corporate Environmental Violations
近年来,企业环保违规频发,既对企业声誉造成不利影响,又对公众及环境造成重大损害.利用2015-2023年沪深A股上市公司数据,探究了"国家队"持股对企业环保违规的影响与作用机制.研究发现,"国家队"持股能够显著抑制企业环保违规行为.进一步研究表明,"国家队"持股可以缓解企业融资约束与代理问题,从而抑制企业环保违规.此外,"国家队"持股对环保违规的抑制作用在非国有企业、规模较小的企业和非四大审计的企业中更为明显.研究成果丰富了企业环保违规的治理研究,有助于进一步探索"国家队"持股的经济影响,为企业绿色发展和政府部门决策提供实证参考.
In recent years,frequent corporate environmental violations have not only adversely affected corporate reputations but also caused significant harm to the public and natural environment.Based on data from Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies spanning 2015 to 2023,this study employs empirical analysis to investigate the relationship between the shareholding ratio of the"National Team"(state-affiliated institutional investors)and corporate environmental violations,while elucidating its underlying mechanisms.The findings reveal that"National Team"shareholdings significantly inhibit corporate environmental violations.Further analysis demonstrates that such shareholdings mitigate corporate financing constraints and agency problems,thereby curbing environmental violations.Additionally,the restraining effect of"National Team"shareholdings on environmental violations is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises,smaller-sized companies,and firms not audited by the Big Four accounting firms.This study enriches research on corporate environmental non-compliance governance,contributing to further exploration of the economic implications of"National Team"shareholdings.It provides empirical insights for corporate green development and government decision-making.
齐祥芹;战新愿;周鑫
南京信息工程大学 商学院,江苏 南京 210044南京信息工程大学 商学院,江苏 南京 210044北京邮电大学 经济与管理学院,北京 100876
管理科学
"国家队"持股环保违规融资约束代理问题
"National Team"shareholdingenvironmental violationsfinancing constraintsagency problem
《科学与管理》 2026 (4)
73-84,12
江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重大项目(2022SJZD007)江苏省研究生科研与实践创新计划项目(KYCX25_1556)国家自然科学基金项目(71602091)
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