应对限容的城市更新契约类型选择与武汉实践OACHSSCD

As a representative of new institutional economics,Barzel examines con-tract choices under positive transaction costs by analyzing three types of landlord-tenant contracts.Urban renewal is a process of repeated bargaining leading to con-tracts.Focusing on the dilemma between"diverse interests"and"public benefits"un-der floor area ratio(FAR)constraints,and examining contract choices among actors,the study identifies three limitations in applying Barzel's theory to urban renewal:dif-ferences in property rights transfer,variations in the governance of ex-ante costs,and neglect of externalities in rent seeking behavior.The study develops an analyti-cal framework of"contract types-ex-ante costs-effects and interventions on exter-nalities-implementation outcomes"through three extensions.First,it introduces a"property rights transfer"dimension,expanding the original framework into four ba-sic contract types.Second,it incorporates rent gap theory to define ex-ante transac-tion costs in primary land market renewal and measures them within Wuhan's con-text.Third,it applies control rights theory to analyze how different actors shape re-newal externalities.The findings reveal that transaction costs and contract choices in-teract dynamically,enabling original rights-holders to participate in residual claims or operational-stage benefit sharing can reduce such costs.Externality interventions,such as government approval and public participation,can reduce opportunism and prevent negative effects.Furthermore,the integration of government coordination,platform embedding,and planning empowerment may help overcome the path depen-dency of high FAR for high gains.The study offers theoretical tools for contract de-sign under FAR constraints and provides practical insights for urban renewal projects that cannot rely on high FAR.