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耐心资本与高管机会主义减持OA

Patient capital and opportunistic reduction of executive holdings

中文摘要英文摘要

以2008-2023 年我国沪深 A 股上市公司为研究样本,探讨耐心资本对高管机会主义减持的影响及作用机制.研究发现:耐心资本能够显著抑制高管机会主义减持行为,该结论在经过一系列稳健性检验后依然成立.机制研究表明,耐心资本通过缓解信息不对称、提升公司内部治理水平,抑制高管机会主义减持.研究结论不仅为耐心资本的治理效应提供了直接证据,也对规范高管减持行为、促进资本市场高质量发展具有重要启示.

Based on the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2023,this paper explores the influence and mechanism of patient capital on the opportunistic share reduction by senior executives.The study finds that patient capital can significantly inhibit the opportunistic share reduction behavior of executives,and this conclusion still holds after a series of robustness tests.Mechanism research indicates that patient capital can alleviate information asymmetry and enhance the internal governance of companies,thereby curbing opportunistic share reduction by senior executives.The research conclusion not only provides direct evidence for the governance effect of patient capital,but also offers significant implications for regulating the share reduction behavior of senior executives and promoting the high-quality development of the capital market.

宋蔚蔚;田美英

重庆理工大学 会计学院,重庆 400054重庆理工大学 会计学院,重庆 400054

管理科学

资本市场耐心资本高管减持信息不对称

capital marketpatient capitalexecutives'opportunistic share reductioninformation asym-metry

《重庆理工大学学报》 2026 (10)

25-38,14

10.3969/j.issn.1674-8425(s).2026.05.004

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