When carrots meet sticks:Reverse carbon leakage driven by carbon regulation conflictsOA
Carbon leakage traditionally refers to the relocation of production to less-regulated regions to reduce carbon costs,which has prompted the adoption of additional carbon regulations such as carbon tariffs and carbon allowances.However,this policy portfolio may also trigger reverse carbon leakage,a relocation behavior in which firms move production to regulated regions to exploit policy arbitrage.We develop a game-theoretic model with dynamic carbon allowances to analyze the interaction among firms’location choices,technology improvement,and regulatory policies.The results show that although a high carbon tariff induces reverse carbon leakage,total emissions increase because production expansion outweighs the reduction in emission intensity.Furthermore,technology improvement unexpectedly intensifies the increase in total emissions through a free-ride effect under the dynamic allowance mechanism,which lowers the tariff threshold for reverse leakage.Additionally,although reverse carbon leakage improves consumer surplus,it may reduce overall social welfare when environmental damage exceeds economic gains.Therefore,regulators should mitigate reverse carbon leakage by setting relatively low carbon tariffs and carbon allowances simultaneously,particularly in industries where technology improvement is possible.
Tianshun Yang;Musen Xue;Wansheng Tang
College of Management and Economics,Tianjin University,Tianjin,300072,ChinaSchool of Management,Tianjin Normal University,Tianjin,300387,ChinaCollege of Management and Economics,Tianjin University,Tianjin,300072,China
管理科学
Reverse carbon leakageSustainable developmentCarbon priceCarbon regulationGame theory
《Journal of Management Science and Engineering》 2026 (2)
P.275-287,13
supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China No.72471164,72001159.
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