Information sharing and sales mode selection in online channels with E-tailer private labelsOA

Selling products online is challenging for manufacturers when competing with the e-tailer’s private labels.This study considers an e-tailer that possesses superior demand information and decides whether to disclose it to a manufacturer.In turn,the manufacturer chooses either agency selling or reselling as the sales mode.Considering the coopetitive relationship between the manufacturer and e-tailer,their decisions become inherently strategic.Our analysis reveals that reselling is more likely to be selected as a cooperative arrangement when an e-tailer shares information.In contrast,agency selling,which intensifies competition with the private label,is more likely to be adopted when the e-tailer withholds information.Moreover,under a low commission rate,the e-tailer is incentivized to share information,leading to a“win–win”outcome for both parties.When the commission rate is moderate,the equilibrium may involve either information sharing with reselling or no information sharing with agency selling.We further examine paid information sharing,where the e-tailer charges the manufacturer for access.Although the manufacturer incurs a cost,this arrangement can generate mutually beneficial outcomes for both firms compared with free information sharing.