Capacity sharing in industrial internet of things-based platform supply chains with product competitionOA

This paper investigates the strategic interaction between platform pricing and inter-manufacturer capacity sharing in a platform-based supply chain,where two competing manufacturers with asymmetric capacities use a third-party platform to facilitate capacity transactions.This study examines how platform pricing shapes manufacturers’capacity sharing strategies,downstream competition,and equilibrium outcomes.Although capacity-sharing platforms are rapidly proliferating in manufacturing,prior literature largely overlooks the strategic interplay between platform governance and manufacturers’competitive behavior.This research fills the gap by providing a systematic theoretical account of how platforms can proactively design pricing to steer co-opetitive manufacturers toward distinct equilibrium regimes,offering actionable insights for platform managers,manufacturers,and policymakers.We develop a game-theoretic model involving a capacity-sharing platform,two competing manufacturers with asymmetric capacity constraints,and a downstream retailer.Using backward induction and Karush-Kuhn-Tucker(KKT)conditions,we analyze four scenarios defined by the binding status of each manufacturer’s capacity constraint,with extensions to profit-sharing contracts and alternative retail structures.The analysis reveals two distinct equilibria:one where only the capacity demander’s constraint binds,and another where both manufacturers’constraints bind,with the transition governed by the capacity-sufficient manufacturer’s capacity level relative to a threshold.We uncover a non-monotonic relationship between platform service fees and market competition—higher fees alleviate competition in the first regime but intensify it in the second.Under profit-sharing contracts,the platform can transform into a two-sided market by charging asymmetrically differentiated fees,thereby enhancing profitability.Our findings offer regime-dependent pricing guidance for platform managers,highlighting that effective platform governance requires diagnosing the underlying capacity structure before setting prices.Manufacturers gain insights into how platform fees affect their competitive positions,while policymakers are reminded that platform intermediation does not automatically resolve capacity allocation inefficiencies;its effectiveness depends on aligning platform incentives with operational constraints.