基于混合链的原子性匿名竞拍系统OA
Atomic anonymous auction system based on the hybrid chain
针对现有基于区块链的竞拍方案在效率、隐私保护和跨链原子性方面的不足,文中提出一种基于混合链的原子性匿名竞拍系统.首先,为提升系统可扩展性并实现负载均衡,设计了包含主链与多条子链的混合区块链架构,有效避免了单链架构下的数据混淆与系统过载问题.其次,为解决用户证书公钥因频繁使用导致的隐私泄露风险,提出了可追踪的环签名证书管理方案,在保障匿名性的同时,允许合规条件下的身份追溯.进一步地,针对多链环境下的数据同步与事务原子性挑战,设计了基于哈希时间锁合约的竞拍协议,通过时间锁与哈希锁的协同机制,确保竞拍操作的原子性.为抑制恶意竞拍行为,引入了基于贝叶斯纳什均衡理论的动态押金机制,确保恶意行为的预期收益低于押金成本.实验结果表明,在高频率、大规模竞拍场景下,文中方案的交易吞吐量优于对比方案,且CPU占用率能控制在合理范围内.同时,押金机制有效约束了恶意竞拍者,使其作恶时的收益显著低于诚实参与者.
To address the limitations of existing blockchain-based auction schemes regarding efficiency,privacy preservation,and cross-chain atomicity,this paper proposes an atomic anonymous auction system based on a hybrid chain architecture.First,to enhance system scalability and achieve load balancing,this paper designs a hybrid blockchain architecture comprising a main chain and multiple sub-chains thus effectively mitigating the issues of data confusion and system overload in single-chain architectures.Second,to address the risk of privacy leakage caused by the frequent use of user certificate public keys,a traceable ring signature-based certificate management scheme is proposed which ensures anonymity while enabling identity tracing under compliant conditions.Furthermore,targeting the challenges of data synchronization and transaction atomicity in multi-chain environments,this paper designs an auction protocol based on hashed time-lock contracts.By utilizing the synergistic mechanism of time locks and hash locks,the atomicity of auction opera-tions is guaranteed.To prevent malicious bidding behaviors,a dynamic deposit mechanism based on the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium theory is designed to ensure that the expected payoff of malicious behavior remains lower than the deposit cost.Experimental results demonstrate that in high-frequency and large-scale auction scenarios,the proposed scheme outperforms comparative schemes in transaction throughput,while keeping CPU usage within a reasonable range.Additionally,the deposit mechanism effectively constrains malicious bidders,making their returns when acting maliciously significantly lower than those of honest participants.
郭校杰;董学文;李光夏;祝幸辉;杨凌霄;沈玉龙
西安电子科技大学 计算机科学与技术学院,陕西 西安 710071西安电子科技大学 计算机科学与技术学院,陕西 西安 710071西安电子科技大学 计算机科学与技术学院,陕西 西安 710071西安电子科技大学 计算机科学与技术学院,陕西 西安 710071陕西师范大学 计算机科学与技术学院,陕西 西安 710062西安电子科技大学 计算机科学与技术学院,陕西 西安 710071
信息技术与安全科学
区块链可追踪的环签名哈希时间锁合约英格兰式拍卖混合链架构原子性
blockchaintraceable ring signaturehash time-lock contractenglish auctionhybrid chain architectureatomicity
《西安电子科技大学学报(自然科学版)》 2026 (3)
1-18,18
国家重点研发计划(2023YFB3107500)国家自然科学基金(62220106004,62502363,92467201)中央高校基本科研业务费(ZDRC2202)陕西省创新能力支撑计划(2023-CX-TD-02)陕西省自然科学基础研究计划(2025JC-YBQN-869)西安电子科技大学交叉探索特资(TZJHF202502)山东省重点研发计划(2023CXPT056,2025CXPT089)山东省自主可靠计算技术与装备重点实验室开放课题(KT25500400-lab)青岛市自然科学基金(25-1-1-156-zyyd-jch)中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(QTZX25119)
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