考虑价值损耗特性的应急物资政企协作储备决策研究OACHSSCD

The occurrence of emergencies is contingency.In order to solve the problem of excessive or insufficient reserves when the government reserves emergency materials alone over-or under-stocking of emergency supplies,a cooperation relationship is established between government and enterprises in the form of government-enterprise collaborative stockpiling.Considering the characteristics of material loss,the degree of material loss is reflected in the rotation and renewal cost generated by the loss.A decision-making model is constructed for the government-enterprise collaborative stockpiling with the objective of maximizing the expected profits of enterprises.The optimal form and amount of reserves is derived for enterprises through Stackelberg game theory.The results indicate that the optimal reserve decision of enterprises is influenced by three factors:the government procurement price,the probability of unexpected emergencies,and the cost of enterprise rotation and update.The willingness of enterprises to choose cooperation with the government increases with the probability of unexpected emergencies and government procurement price.Among them,as the cost of rotation updates increases,the physical reserves of the enterprise will correspondingly decrease,and the production capacity reserves will also increase accordingly.Finally,the conclusions obtained are verified through arithmetic numerical examples,providing a scientific basis for enterprise reserve decision-making.