前景理论下供应链中断应急策略的演化博弈OACHSSCD
Evolutionary Game Research on Emergency Strategies for Supply Chain Disruptions under Prospect Theory
近年来供应链中断事件频发,供应链成员协同应急决策面临更大挑战.将企业应急策略划分为激进型与稳健型,供应链合作伙伴策略则分为合作与不合作2类.结合前景理论,构建演化博弈模型,并采用数值仿真验证不同核心参数对应急策略演化路径的影响,揭示心理认知与环境约束对应急策略演化的作用机制.研究发现:提高合作伙伴对违约成本的感知价值,增强企业对策略风险的认知,是推动系统向最优均衡收敛的关键路径;其次,损失规避系数与损失感知敏感系数的提升,会显著抑制企业的风险偏好与合作伙伴的协作意愿,而收益感知敏感系数的增大则会刺激双方选择高收益策略;此外,企业与合作伙伴对策略失败的概率存在心理感知差异,双方对概率的主观扭曲是导致策略错配的重要原因;进一步来看,时间压力感知存在阈值效应,当时间压力较小时,企业更倾向选择激进策略,合作伙伴更愿意协作,且合作伙伴对时间压力的敏感性通常高于企业.综上表明供应链中断应急策略并非仅由客观收益最大化决定,还由合作约束、心理认知和时间压力共同驱动.研究为供应链中断情境下企业优化应急策略、完善合作治理机制提供理论依据和决策支持.
In recent years,supply chain disruption incidents have occurred frequently,so supply chain members are facing greater challenges in collaborative emergency decision-making.Enterprises' emer-gency strategies are classified into aggressive and conservative types,while supply chain partners' strat-egies are divided into cooperative and non-cooperative categories.Combining prospect theory,an evolu-tionary game model is constructed and numerical simulation is adopted to verify the influence of differ-ent core parameters on the evolution path of emergency strategies,revealing the mechanism of psycho-logical cognition and environmental constraints on the evolution of emergency strategies.The findings indicate that enhancing the perceived value of default costs by partners and strengthening enterprises' awareness of strategic risks are the key path to promote the system convergence towards the optimal e-quilibrium.In addition,the increase of the loss' aversion coefficient and perception sensitivity coeffi-cient will significantly suppress the risk appetite of enterprises and the willingness of partners to collab-orate,while the increase of the gain perception sensitivity coefficient will stimulate both sides to choose high-yield strategies.Moreover,there are psychological perception differences between enterprises and partners regarding the probability of strategy failure,while the subjective distortions of probability of both sides is an important cause of strategy mismatch.Furthermore,there is a threshold effect in the perception of time pressure,namely when the time pressure is relatively small,enterprises are more in-clined to choose aggressive strategies and partners are more willing to collaborate;meanwhile,partners are generally more sensitive to time pressure than enterprises.Overall,these findings suggest that emer-gency strategies for supply chain disruptions are not determined solely by objective benefit maximiza-tion,but are jointly driven by cooperation constraints,psychological cognition,and time pressure.This study provides theoretical evidence and decision-making support for enterprises to optimize emergency strategies and improve cooperative governance mechanisms in the context of supply chain disruptions.
阮国祥;荆冬晴
山东工商学院 工商管理学院,山东烟台 264005山东科技大学 经济管理学院,山东青岛 266590
管理科学
供应链中断供应链应急策略前景理论演化博弈时间压力
supply chain disruptionsupply chain emergency strategyprospect theoryevolutionary gametime pressure
《技术与创新管理》 2026 (4)
414-424,11
国家社会科学基金项目(22BGL039)
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