演化博弈视角下政府性融资担保的经济效应OACHSSCD

Resolving the financing difficulties of micro and small enterprises(MSEs)is a crucial link in promoting high-quality economic development.As an important policy-oriented financial tool,whether the effectiveness of government-backed financing guarantees can be successfully translated into developmental momentum for MSEs and optimize the allocation of financial resources is a key focus for both theoretical and practical circles.Existing research predominantly focuses on macro-level impact assessments or single-agent analysis,with a scarcity of systematic examination of the strategic interactions among the three core actors:government,banks,and enterprises.From the perspective of micro-level agent interactions,this study theoretically and empirically investigates the dual impact of government-backed financing guarantees on MSE entrepreneurship and survival,their mechanisms,and potential economic consequences. This paper first constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government,banks,and enterprises.Theoretically,it analyzes how government credit intervention influences the credit market equilibrium by altering the expected payoffs and strategy choices of the involved parties,revealing that the policy's effectiveness depends on the co-evolution of social benefits,compensation costs,and agent behaviors.Subsequently,utilizing nationwide industrial and commercial enterprise registration data from 2011-2022,and treating the gradual implementation of government-backed financing guarantee systems across cities as a quasi-natural experiment,we construct a multi-period difference-in-differences(DID)model for empirical testing.The reliability of the baseline results is ensured through a series of robustness checks.The findings indicate that:(1)Government-backed financing guarantees significantly enhance the entrepreneurial vitality and survival resilience of MSEs at the regional level,demonstrating the policy's positive effect in both stimulating market"increment"and ensuring developmental"quality."(2)The policy's efficacy exhibits significant regional heterogeneity,manifesting as a"complementary effect"with the level of digital technology development and a"promoting effect"on factor market mobility;the marginal effect of the policy is more pronounced in regions with weaker digital infrastructure and lower market potential.(3)From the bank's perspective,the policy does not induce significant moral hazard;instead,it improves bank loan quality by optimizing bank-enterprise matching,achieving a balance between credit expansion and risk control.(4)From the government's perspective,current guarantee expenditures do not impose an overall burden on local public finance;however,regional fiscal pressure significantly moderates the policy effect.In regions with high fiscal pressure,while the policy promotes entrepreneurship,it fails to effectively enhance the long-term survival resilience of MSEs. The marginal contributions of this paper are threefold.First,by introducing an evolutionary game framework,it provides dynamic theoretical support for analyzing the micro-level mechanisms of government-backed financing guarantees.Second,it deepens the policy assessment from a simple"presence or absence"comparison to the dual dimensions of"entrepreneurship"and"survival,"offering more comprehensive empirical evidence.Third,it constructs a holistic"policy tool-transmission path-economic consequence"analytical framework,revealing the policy's impact on both the banking and government sectors.The conclusions offer important policy implications for optimizing the government-backed financing guarantee system,implementing regionally adaptive policy designs,and balancing risk prevention with resource adaptation,providing a theoretical basis and decision-making reference for enhancing the effectiveness of financial services in supporting the real economy.