产教融合的"制度性利益陷阱"及其破解OA

The 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China and the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee have made strategic deployments for industry-education integration.However,school-enterprise cooperation faces an"institutional interest trap",characterized by the dual dilemma of ambiguous property rights and imbalanced risk distribution.From a game-theoretic perspective,this study constructs a game model of interests in school-enterprise cooperation,deconstructing the trap from the dimensions of property rights definition,risk sharing and game imbalance,and analyzing its composite drivers,including institutional lag,information asymmetry,market mechanism failure,and governance system imbalance.Accordingly,it is necessary to establish a property rights institutional supply system for long-term game equilibrium,innovate risk governance pathways for long-term game equilibrium,reform the benefit distribution mechanism for long-term game equilibrium,and build an incentive-constraint mechanism for long-term game equilibrium.