大模型代理的风险治理OACHSSCD

Risk Governance of Large Language Model Agents

中文摘要英文摘要

大模型代理是人工智能技术演进的新形式,也是人工智能家长主义理念的具象化.基于法律家长主义与人工智能家长主义的对比,人工智能家长主义与法律家长主义在干预主体、干预方式、干预机制上具有差异性,在干预目标、干预质疑、干预程度上具有相似性.从法律家长主义的立场出发,是否允许一定程度上的人工智能家长主义,应当基于新型人工智能技术代理决策的社会成本收益分析.从收益侧观察,大模型代理可以提升决策者的信息能力,抵抗决策过程中的熵增,矫正决策结果的人类偏见.从成本侧考虑,相比于传统的辅助决策手段,大模型代理降低了决策成本,但相比于自我决策,仍可能产生技术工具失灵的风险和限制自由意志的风险.因此,考虑到大模型代理将产生更多社会福利改进,应革新大模型代理的决策确认机制、行为监管机制和责任分担机制,更好地发挥人工智能家长主义的作用.

Large Language Model agents(LLM agents)stand as a new evolution of artificial intelligence(AI)technology,embodying the governance philosophy of artificial intelligence paternalism(AI paternalism).LLM agents are primarily engaged in technical information screening and instruction conversion.The ultimate attribution of rights and obligations,however,remains rooted in the relationships among users,AI operators,and third-party service providers.These relationships include the basic legal bond between users and third-party service providers,the technical service relationship between users and AI operators,and the technical interaction between AI operators and third-party service providers. This paper first employs a normative research approach.Building on a comparison between legal paternalism and AI paternalism,it highlights that the latter differs from the former in terms of intervention subjects,methods,and mechanisms-while sharing similarities in intervention objectives,doubts about intervention,and degrees of intervention.In conducting a substantive analysis of the concept of AI paternalism,the cost-benefit analysis method is introduced.It argues that when the law examines AI paternalism from a paternalistic perspective,the decision of whether to allow AI to act as a paternalistic agent in certain contexts should be based on a social cost-benefit analysis of LLM.On the benefit side,LLM can enhance decision-makers' information capacity,counteract the increase of entropy in the decision-making process,and rectify human biases in decision outcomes.On the cost side,compared with traditional human decision-making,LLM can reduce decision-making costs;yet when measured against autonomous decision-making,they may give rise to risks such as technical failure and the risk of restricting free will.Consequently,on the premise that LLM agents contribute to improved social welfare,the role of AI paternalism should be better leveraged by innovating the decision confirmation mechanism,behavior supervision mechanism,and liability allocation mechanism for large model agents. This paper makes two key extensions.First,it focuses on LLM agents as an emerging form of AI technology,offering an in-depth analysis of this new technology from the perspective of legal relations while exploring the theory of AI paternalism that underpins it.Second,unlike most articles on AI law that adopt a doctrinal analysis approach,this paper introduces the cost-benefit analysis method to examine the consequences of applying LLM agents in decision-making. This study uncovers the internal logic of AI's participation in decision-making,helping to better understand the relationship between humans and machines in the era of human-machine symbiosis and providing intellectual support for the standardized application of large model agent technology.

张钦昱;王淑瑶

中国政法大学民商经济法学院,北京 100088中国政法大学民商经济法学院,北京 100088

社会科学

大模型代理法律关系人工智能家长主义人工智能体技术价值评估风险治理成本收益分析

large language model agent(LLM agent)legal relationshipartificial intelligence paternalism(AI paternalism)artificial intelligence agent(AI agent)technology value evaluationrisk governancecost-benefit analysis

《西安交通大学学报(社会科学版)》 2026 (3)

139-149,11

北京市习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想研究中心重大项目(25LLFXA134).

10.15896/j.xjtuskxb.202603013

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