布雷顿森林体系演进中的全球稳定币监管博弈和中国应对OACHSSCD

As a product of financial innovation,stablecoins have demonstrated potential in enhancing cross-border payment efficiency,integrating on-chain and off-chain financial systems,and promoting inclusive finance through their price stability mechanisms,emerging as a frontier focus of global financial competition.Since 2023,major economies including the EU,the US,and Hong Kong of China have successively formed stablecoins regulatory frameworks,and the regulatory competition surrounding stablccoins has intensified.Although current research has conducted multi-dimensional discussions on stablecoins,it generally exhibits two limitations.On the one hand,it lacks a macro perspective integrated with geopolitics and insufficiently sorts out and compares global regulatory frameworks,resulting in weak local adaptability of the proposed policy recommendations.On the other hand,it fails to conduct a systematic examination of stablecoins within the evolution of the international monetary system,leading to inadequate practical relevance of the policy suggestions. Starting from the core definition,types,and monetary attributes of stablecoins,this paper focuses on analyzing the remedial role and limitations of stablccoins in addressing the flaws of Bretton Woods System 2.0.In terms of capital liquidity,stablecoins improve cross-border transaction efficiency through blockchain technology and provide supplementary liquidity tools for emerging markets,but they also exacerbate the concentration of global US dollar-denominated capital and amplify systemic risks.In terms of trade imbalances,they can only optimize the micro-experience of cross-border payments and cannot resolve deep-seated causes such as the division of labor in the global value chain and differences in savings rates,and their deep integration with the US dollar system may strengthen the pattern of trade imbalances.In terms of US dollar dependence,while they provide technical possibilities to bypass traditional US dollar clearing infrastructure,the current situation where mainstream stablecoins are pegged to the US dollar essentially consolidates US dollar hegemony.The current regulatory competition among major economies around stablecoins is essentially a forward-looking contest for rule-making power in the era of Bretton Woods System 3.0. Based on this macro judgment,this paper conducts a comparative study on the stablccoins regulatory frameworks of the EU,the US,and Hong Kong of China.The three major economics have reached consensus on unified functional characterization,reserve asset constraints,implementation of licensing systems,and extraterritorial effect penetration,while showing path differentiation due to differences in regulatory objectives.Faced with opportunities and challenges,China needs to critically draw on the experience of the EU and the US.On the basis of balancing financial innovation and risk prevention and control,it should gradually promote the development of offshore RMB stablecoins with Hong Kong as a pilot,build a functional complementary mechanism between digital RMB(e-CNY)and offshore RMB stablecoins,and proactively participate in international digital currency governance to promote the development of the international monetary system in a diversified and inclusive direction. This paper breaks through the narrative that regards stablecoins merely as a technological innovation.By placing them in the context of the evolution of the Bretton Woods System,it argues that the reasonable positioning of stablecoins should be a supplementary tool to optimize the 2.0 system,rather than a core pillar of systemic revolution.The clarification of this positioning provides a theoretical framework for understanding the regulatory strategic competition among major global economies,and also offers a decision-making basis for China to plan the path of RMB internationalization under the premise of financial security.