基于非合作博弈和收益分配机制的多微网鲁棒协同调度策略OA
Robust Collaborative Scheduling Strategy of Multi-Microgrid Based on Non-Cooperative Game and Income Distribution Mechanism
可再生能源出力不确定性以及电价波动影响电能共享管理.为了确定多微网系统电能共享支付的公平性,文中构建了一种基于非合作博弈和收益分配机制的多微网两阶段鲁棒协同调度模型,以此降低多微网系统的总运行成本并确保每个微电网均能够在所提模型中受益.在第 1 阶段考虑了电价波动以及风、光电出力不确定性,并使用鲁棒处理建立多微网电能管理模型,在各微网之间实现点对点电能共享.在第 2 阶段针对共享电能的收益分配机制问题建立了基于非合作博弈的成本降低率(Cost Reduction Ratio Distribution,CRRD)模型,利用广义纳什均衡确定共享电能的出清与结算.文中采用列和约束生成法(Column and Constraint Generation,C&CG)对第 1 阶段问题进行求解,并采用交替方向乘子法(Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers,ADMM)对第2 阶段问题进行求解.算例分析结果表明,所提模型可以降低各个微网的运行成本.
The uncertainty of renewable energy output and fluctuations in electricity prices affect the manage-ment of electricity sharing.To determine the fairness of power sharing payment in multi-microgrid systems,this study constructs a two-stage robust collaborative scheduling model for multi-microgrids based on non-cooperative games and revenue distribution mechanisms,thereby reducing the total operating cost of multi-microgrid systems and ensu-ring that each microgrid can benefit from the proposed model.In the first stage,the fluctuation of electricity prices and the uncertainty of wind and photovoltaic output are considered,and a multi-microgrid power management model is established using robust processing to achieve point-to-point power sharing among the microgrids.In the second stage,a CRRD(Cost Reduction Ratio Distribution)model based on non-cooperative game is established for the rev-enue distribution mechanism of shared electric energy,and the generalized Nash equilibrium is used to determine the clearing and settlement of shared electric energy.The first stage problem is solved using the C&CG(Column and Con-straint Generation)and the second stage problem is solved using the ADMM(Alternating Direction Method of Multi-pliers).The results of the case study analysis show that the proposed model can reduce the operating costs of each microgrid.
付涛涛;杨超
贵州大学 电气工程学院,贵州 贵阳 550025贵州大学 电气工程学院,贵州 贵阳 550025
信息技术与安全科学
微电网非合作博弈收益分配机制电价波动电能共享纳什均衡鲁棒优化成本降低率
microgridsnon-cooperative gameprofit allocation mechanismelectricity prices fluctuateelectrici-ty sharingNash equilibriumrobust optimizationcost reduction rate
《电子科技》 2026 (7)
56-66,11
贵州省科学技术基金(黔科合基础-ZK[2021]一般 277) Science and Technology Foundation of Guizhou(Guizhou Science and Technology Foundation-ZK[2021]General 277)
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