"互联网+"背景下考虑消费者行为的废旧电器电子产品闭环供应链决策OA
Decision-making in WEEE Closed-loop Supply Chain Considering Consumer Behavior in"Internet+"Background
基于"互联网+回收"背景,在由制造商和在线回收平台组成的废旧电器电子产品闭环供应链中,分别构建单渠道(仅在线平台回收)和双渠道(制造商与在线平台共同回收)两种回收模式下的Stackelberg博弈模型,比较不同回收模式及消费者在购买再制品时的价值感知差异和在回收时的渠道偏好行为异质性对供应链决策的影响,并通过数值分析进行验证.研究结果表明,定价机制存在结构性差异,再制品零售价受新产品成本、再制造成本及折扣系数共同调节,批发价随再制造成本与折扣系数动态变化,而新产品价格仅由制造成本决定;不同回收模式的总体成本相当,呈现成本中性特征,单渠道平台定价受网络消费者比例、残值与回收效用系数驱动,制造商回收价仅与回收产品残值关联,双渠道中制造商转移价格恒定,供应链整体回收量增长;成本趋同引发利润分化,当再制造成本与新产品制造成本逐渐接近时,制造商的利润得以提升,而平台的利润空间则受到挤压,双方利润呈现反向变化关系.
Based on the"Internet+Recycling"initiative,a closed-loop supply chain invol-ving a manufacturer and an online recycling platform was examined.Stackelberg game models were developed for both single-channel and dual-channel recycling modes.The effects of recycling structures and consumer heterogeneity in consumption and recycling on supply chain decisions were analyzed,with support from numerical simulations.Research findings indicate that structural differences exist in pricing mechanisms,with the retail price of remanufactured products being jointly regulated by the cost of new products,re-manufacturing costs,and discount coefficients.The wholesale price depends on remanu-facturing cost and the discount factor;while the new product price is determined solely by manufacturing cost.Total costs are similar across recycling modes,suggesting cost neu-trality.Under single-channel recycling,the platform's pricing is affected by the online consumer share,residual value,and recycling utility,whereas the manufacturer's buy-back price correlates only with residual value.In dual-channel recycling,the manufactur-er's transfer price remains fixed,increasing the total recycling volume.As remanufactur-ing costs approach new product costs,the manufacturer's profit rises while the platform's profit declines,revealing an inverse relationship in profitability.
陈维平;张黎明;胡子璇;张嘉欣
青岛大学 商学院,青岛 266061青岛大学 经济学院,青岛 266061青岛大学 商学院,青岛 266061青岛大学 商学院,青岛 266061
管理科学
废旧电器电子产品闭环供应链消费者行为Stackelberg博弈
waste electrical and electronic equipmentclosed-loop supply chainconsumer behaviorStackelberg game
《青岛大学学报(自然科学版)》 2026 (2)
69-77,9
山东省自然科学基金面上项目(批准号:ZR2022MG048)资助.
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