基于演化博弈的工程履约担保-工程质量潜在缺陷保险协同机制研究OA

[Objective]Financial instruments such as performance bonds and insurance play central roles in controlling construction risk.Performance bonds aim to enforce contractors' contractual obligations,whereas inherent defect insurance(IDI)compensates for latent quality defects revealed after project completion.Existing studies have typically treated these mechanisms as independent systems,despite the fact that in practice,subjective and objective risks in construction projects are often intertwined.Insufficient contractor effort may lead to extensive quality defects that exceed insurers' risk-bearing capacity,leading insurers to commission technical inspection services(TIS)to supervise construction quality during project execution.This arrangement results in an overlap between the risk-control functions of performance bonds and IDI.Therefore,this study aims to examine whether performance bonds and IDI can form a synergistic risk-control mechanism,evaluating its implications for construction quality and market evolution using a dynamic analytical framework.[Methods]A tripartite evolutionary game model was developed to represent interactions among performance bond agencies,contractors,and TIS institutions commissioned by IDI insurers.Bond agencies choose between strict and lenient pre-issuance reviews,contractors engage in high-or low-level performance effort,and TIS decides between rigorous and non-rigorous supervision.The participants maximize expected payoffs by balancing the revenues,management costs,and losses arising from defaults or quality defects.The model incorporates 21 parameters,including bond coverage ratio,premium,management costs,and compensation ratios.Payoff matrices were constructed to derive decision fitness functions and replicator dynamic equations describing strategy evolution under bounded rationality.The stability of pure and mixed strategy equilibria was examined using Jacobian matrices and Lyapunov stability criteria,and parameter values were calibrated using expert interviews and data from domestic and international construction markets.Moreover,sensitivity analyses were conducted on key factors,including bond coverage ratio,compensation levels,contractor performance differentials,screening accuracy of bond agencies,and the effectiveness of TIS in reducing bond payouts and insurance claims.[Results]The results of numerical simulations indicate that collaborative risk control between performance bond agencies and TIS consistently outperforms independent supervision by each party.Coordinated oversight strengthens contractors' incentives to maintain high performance levels,reducing default probabilities and claim frequencies for bond agencies and insurers.In contrast,when bond agencies and insurers operate independently,contractors tend to adopt lower-effort strategies,increasing quality risks and financial burdens.Among all parameters,the bond coverage ratio exerts the strongest influence on evolutionary outcomes.Higher bond coverage induces stricter early-stage screening by bond agencies,restricting market entry for low-performing contractors and improving overall market efficiency.Effective TIS supervision reinforces these effects by lowering contractor default rates and indirectly reducing bond compensation costs.Furthermore,the simulations indicate that initial market conditions,in particular,disparities in contractor performance,affect the speed and stability of convergence.In markets with a high level of initial heterogeneity among contractors,coordinated and stringent supervision accelerates evolution toward high-performance equilibria,demonstrating the corrective function of synergistic risk control.[Conclusions]The findings confirm that performance bonds and IDI act as a synergistic risk-control mechanism,facilitated by TIS,improving contractors' performance and reducing systemic risk more effectively than these instruments in isolation.By applying evolutionary game theory,the study reveals how dynamic collaborations among key stakeholders shape long-term stability.The results support the use of integrated risk-control frameworks that combine bond and insurance functions.Policy and market design may benefit from prioritizing mandatory bond-insurance schemes for projects with significant public safety implications,such as residential buildings,strengthening the authority and remuneration mechanisms of TIS,enhancing information-sharing and professional training across the bond and insurance sectors,and improving credit availability in the construction industry to promote transparency and efficient market entry.Together,these measures contribute to a healthier construction market and support high-quality industry development.