中国式现代化背景下考虑利他偏好的农产品供应链协调研究OA

Building an agricultural power is the foundation of comprehensively advancing Chinese modernization,and it is essential to prioritize the stable supply of agricultural products.Considering the altruistic preference of an enterprise under the impact of adverse weather on agricultural output,this paper constructs a Stackelberg game model of a two-level agricultural product supply chain dominated by the enterprise.It analyzes the influences of corporate altruistic preference on farmers'effort level,corporate procurement price,and the coordination degree of the agricultural product supply chain.The research conclusions show the following conclusions.First,corporate altruistic preference can upgrade farmers'effort level and corporate procurement price,and the larger the altruistic preference coefficient,the faster the improvement of farmers'effort level;secondly,the revenue-sharing contract can raise farmers'effort level,increase the profits of farmers and the whole supply chain system,and realize the coordination of agricultural product supply chain,while reducing corporate profits;thirdly,the combined contract of"revenue sharing plus franchise fee"can not only achieve the coordination of agricultural product supply chain,but also realize the Pareto improvement of profits of all supply chain members,and effectively enhance the stability of agricultural product supply chain.