考虑反向定制产品风险的平台供应链价值共创OA

With the rapid development of the platform economy,the reverse customization model—by directly connecting consumer groups with manufacturing factories—has gradually become a new paradigm for product value co-creation.While reverse-customized products bring great opportunities for platforms and suppliers,they are also accompanied by uncertainty and risks associated with market entry.How to decide whether to explore reverse customization information on platforms and how to share such information are crucial issues for platforms.This paper constructs a closed-loop supply chain system consisting of a single supplier and a single retail platform and designs three strategies considering the risk of reverse-customized products:no information sharing(NI),free information sharing strategy(FI),and toll information sharing(TI).It employs a Stackelberg game to derive equilibrium solutions.The results show that when consumer heterogeneity in product perception is low and the cost of new product improvement is at extreme levels,FI and TI strategies outperform the NI strategy in improving platform profits.However,as consumer heterogeneity and the cost of product improvement increase,both the platform and the supplier tend to choose the NI strategy.In addition,under the TI strategy,the platform's commission rate has a positive effect on profits,indicating that the TI strategy is generally superior to both FI and NI strategies.As platform profits increase,there is greater incentive to invest in information technology to further mine consumer feedback,enabling more accurate identification of consumer preferences and consequently reducing suppliers' costs of new product improvement.This paper provides a theoretical foundation and decision support for platform enterprises in terms of information sharing and value co-creation from the perspective of risks associated with new and existing products.