商用车制造企业货运平台引入与开放决策OA

Commercial vehicle manufacturers are actively deploying freight transportation platforms,which not only provide services to product buyers but also effectively stimulate the commercial vehicle sales market.From the perspective of the manufacturer expanding into freight platform,this paper innovatively explores the interaction between commercial vehicle sales decisions and freight service decisions.It focuses on a freight market composed of commercial vehicle manufacturers,logistics service providers,and shippers.It develops game-theoretic models under three strategies:no platform introduction,platform introduction,and platform openness.It further evaluates the impact of different cost structures and market environments on decision-making behavior.The results show that the introduction and continued operation of freight platforms depend on the scale of fixed costs and the potential demand in existing channels.Under certain conditions,platform introduction can achieve a win-win outcome for all parties.The unit value-added service revenue of the platform and the potential market size influence the platform openness decision.However,firms must undertake additional technological investments,and if investment efficiency is insufficient,excessively high value-added service revenue may instead hinder platform openness.In a monopolistic market,technological investment costs of the platform erode the introducer's profits,whereas in a competitive market,the introducer can gain a competitive advantage through technological investment and achieve profit growth.