考虑碳信息披露的供应链减排技术授权策略OA

Focusing on the carbon information disclosure behavior of low-emission-reduction manufacturers and the emission reduction technology licensing strategies of high-emission-reduction manufacturers in a duopolistic supply chain,this paper constructs three types of game-theoretic models under two scenarios—"no carbon information disclosure"and"carbon information disclosure":no licensing,per-unit royalty licensing,and fixed-fee licensing.It investigates enterprises' decisions on carbon information disclosure and emission reduction technology licensing within the supply chain.The results show that when a low-emission-reduction manufacturer chooses not to disclose carbon information,it will hinder the formation of licensing cooperation between the two types of manufacturers.For the low-emission-reduction manufacturer,regardless of whether carbon information is disclosed,accepting any form of emission reduction technology licensing improves its profit,and it shows a preference for the per-unit royalty licensing.In contrast,the high-emission-reduction manufacturer's preference for licensing mode depends on the level of disclosure cost:when disclosure costs are low,it prefers the fixed-fee licensing mode;otherwise,it favors the per-unit royalty mode.Given that licensing cooperation is achieved,the disclosure of carbon reduction information by the low-emission-reduction manufacturer does not harm its own profit.However,whether this behavior benefits the high-emission-reduction manufacturer depends jointly on the licensing mode and the disclosure cost.When the low-emission-reduction manufacturer does not disclose information,both licensing modes are beneficial to the environment and society.When carbon information is disclosed,the fixed-fee licensing mode can achieve a win-win outcome in terms of environmental performance,consumer benefits,and social welfare.