生产约束下电池再制造的新能源汽车供应链定价决策研究OACHSSCD

This study investigates how battery remanufacturers'capacity conditions at different development stages influence decision-making in a new energy vehicle closed-loop supply chain.A two-stage Stackelberg game is formulated between a vehicle manufacturer and a battery remanufacturer,in which novel production constraints induced by remanufactured battery transactions and the manufacturer's learning effect are incorporated.The analysis shows that when the remanufacturer is at an early development stage with remanufacturing capacity constraints,the remanufacturer's collection effort,collection volume,and profit admit a unique equilibrium and increase with the transaction price of remanufactured batteries,while the manufacturer's pricing,sales,and profit exhibit piecewise equilibrium characteristics.In this case,higher consumer acceptance of remanufactured products does not affect the remanufacturer's profit and does not necessarily improve the manufacturer's profit.When the remanufacturer enters a mature stage characterized by battery production constraints,the manufacturer's pricing,sales,and profit possess a unique equilibrium,with product prices positively related to the battery transaction price,whereas the remanufacturer's collection effort and profit vary with the transaction price,and increased consumer acceptance is not always beneficial to the manufacturer.Furthermore,in the ab-sence of learning effects,the manufacturer's pricing decisions are identical across the two scenarios and independent of the remanufacturer's behavior.The role of learning is shown to be scenario-dependent:strengthening the learning effect does not neces-sarily reduce prices but always increases the manufacturer's profit in the early-stage scenario,while under the mature-stage scena-rio it can,under certain conditions,generate positive effects for all members and improve overall system performance.