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退耕还林背景下流域横向生态补偿博弈分析OA

Game Analysis of Ecological Compensation of Watershed Considering the Grain-for-Green

中文摘要英文摘要

实施流域生态补偿对提升水资源高效利用和促进生态保护与高质量发展具有重要意义,然而,补偿标准的合理性一直是补偿工作的难点.研究基于退耕还林(草)工程背景,创新性地探索从广义水资源的角度,设计基于水足迹生态补偿模型、总成本修正模型、水资源价值法测算流域生态补偿标准的框架,结合博弈论模拟流域横向生态补偿博弈过程,首先通过水足迹模型量化生态服务价值流,确定补偿方向,然后引入总成本修正模型,核算生态保护的成本,同时结合水资源价值法,建立基于市场调节的定价机制.以延河流域为例,探讨补偿结果的合理性.结果表明:基于水足迹的补偿模型能有效识别生态服务供需关系,可以判断补偿方向,计算出下游认为上游愿意接受的最低补偿为0.43亿元;总成本修正模型揭示了下游支付意愿上限与上游成本回收底线之间的显著差异,测算出下游愿意支付的最高补偿额度是3.31亿元,上游接受补偿的最低标准是1.92亿元;通过合作博弈模型求解的纳什均衡解表明,当下游向上游支付1.99亿元生态补偿,同时上游向下游提供0.63亿元生态补偿,可实现流域整体效益最大化.研究结果表明采用多种方法耦合计算双方接受补偿的意愿,并通过博弈判断双方最终实现合作的最优解,可以为实现横向生态补偿提供参考.

The implementation of basin ecological compensation holds significant importance for enhancing water resource utilization efficiency and promoting ecological conservation and high-quality development.However,the rationality of compensation standards has remained a persistent challenge in compensation practices.Building upon the context of China's Grain for Green Project(a large-scale afforestation/grassland restoration initiative),this study innovatively explores a framework for calculating basin ecological compensation standards from a generalized water resource perspective.The proposed methodology integrates three core components:① a water footprint-based compensation model to quantify ecological service value flows and determine compensation direction,② a total cost revision model for accounting ecological protection expenditures,and ③ a water resource valuation method to establish market-oriented pricing mechanisms.By coupling these models with game theory simulations of inter-basin negotiation processes,the research examines compensation rationality through a case study of the Yanhe River Basin.The findings demonstrate that the water footprint model effectively identifies ecological service supply-demand relationships,calculating the minimum compensation the downstream parties are willing to accept from the upstream at 43 million yuan.The total cost revision model reveals significant disparities between the downstream payment willingness(upper limit of 331 million yuan)and the upstream cost recovery thresholds(minimum of 192 million yuan).Cooperative game modeling yields Nash equilibrium solutions:when the downstream pays 199 million yuan of ecological compensation to the upstream,and the upstream provides 63 million yuan of ecological compensation to the downstream as ecological compensation,the overall benefits of the basin can be maximized.The study validates that coupling multiple calculation methods to assess compensation willingness,combined with game-theoretic analysis of cooperative equilibria,provides a robust reference framework for implementing horizontal ecological compensation mechanisms.This approach offers viable solutions for balancing ecological protection and regional development in water resource governance.

夏帆;刘明君;严登明;张冬青;苏妍妹;边志伟

黄河勘测规划设计研究院有限公司,河南 郑州 450003||水利部黄河流域水治理与水安全重点实验室(筹),河南 郑州 450003黄河勘测规划设计研究院有限公司,河南 郑州 450003||水利部黄河流域水治理与水安全重点实验室(筹),河南 郑州 450003黄河勘测规划设计研究院有限公司,河南 郑州 450003||水利部黄河流域水治理与水安全重点实验室(筹),河南 郑州 450003黄河勘测规划设计研究院有限公司,河南 郑州 450003||水利部黄河流域水治理与水安全重点实验室(筹),河南 郑州 450003黄河勘测规划设计研究院有限公司,河南 郑州 450003华北水利水电大学,河南 郑州 450046

建筑与水利

广义水资源水足迹合作博弈生态补偿延河流域

generalized water resourceswater footprintcooperative gameecological compensationYanhe River Basin

《中国农村水利水电》 2026 (5)

45-51,7

国家重点研发计划项目(2022YFC3202400)国家自然科学基金项目(52209038)黄河勘测规划设计研究院有限公司自主研究开发项目(2025KY039(2)).

10.12396/znsd.2500939

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