基于演化博弈的家电行业三方策略选择OA
Tripartite Strategy Selection of Home Appliance Industry Based on Evolutionary Game
基于演化博弈理论,构建了政府、家电企业、消费者三方博弈模型,探讨各主体的决策行为及其动态均衡轨迹.研究结果表明,家电企业行为主要受政府的策略影响,政府补贴能够有效降低企业低碳转型的经济门槛,促进家电产品的更新换代和消费升级.通过以旧换新的方式,大量老旧家电得以回收和处理,减少了资源浪费和环境污染,新家电产品更加节能、环保.家电企业低碳成本、政府监管时消费者低碳消费给家电企业带来的额外收益、低碳家电与传统家电价格差是促进模型向政府监管、家电企业积极提供低碳家电、消费者选择低碳消费的理想稳定状态演化的重要决定因素.
Based on the evolutionary game theory,a tripartite game model involving the government,home appliance enterprises and consumers was constructed to explore the de-cision-making behaviors of each subject and their dynamic equilibrium trajectories.The re-search results show that the government behavior of home appliance enterprises is mainly influenced by the government strategies.Government subsidies can effectively lower the e-conomic threshold for enterprises low-carbon transformation and promote the renewal and upgrading of home appliance products and consumption.Through the trade-in program,a large number of old household appliances have been recycled and processed,reducing re-source waste and environmental pollution.New household appliances are more energy-effi-cient and environmentally friendly.The low-carbon cost of home appliance enterprises,the additional benefits brought to home appliance enterprises by consumers low-carbon consumption during government supervision,and the price difference between low-carbon home appliances and traditional home appliances are important determinants that promote the evolution of the model towards an ideal stable state where government supervision,home appliance enterprises actively provide low-carbon home appliances,and consumers choose low-carbon consumption.
李琪;张桂涛
青岛大学商学院,青岛 266061青岛大学商学院,青岛 266061
管理科学
绿色消费政府补贴政策家电行业演化博弈
green consumptiongovernment subsidy policyhome appliance industryevo-lutionary game
《青岛大学学报(自然科学版)》 2026 (1)
52-60,9
国家社会科学基金(批准号:19BGL091)资助.
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