反竞争情报驱动下深度伪造的拒止演化博弈研究OACHSSCD
An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Deepfake Denial Driven by Anti-Competitive Intelligence
[目的]构建基于反竞争情报主动拒止的新范式,为企业提供前瞻性的战略指引,使其可以在真假难辨的数字化博弈中从源头阻断攻击链条、重构商业安全免疫屏障.[方法]运用演化博弈理论,从反竞争情报视角出发,构建由企业、伪造者和监管机构组成的博弈主体,讨论其在深度伪造过程中的博弈行为.根据不同行为策略的收益、成本和损失,计算博弈三方的支付矩阵,分析演化稳定策略,并用数值仿真对结论进行佐证.[结果/结论]研究发现:企业与监管机构通过采取积极防御与强化监管的策略,能够协同推动反竞争情报驱动的系统向成熟阶段演化,形成稳定的动态拒止体系;技术防御成功率的提升能够显著促进企业采用积极防御策略;监管机构对伪造者与企业施加双向惩罚约束是实现深度伪造有效拒止的驱动因素.
[Purpose]Confronted with the dual challenges of trust crises among competing enterprises triggered by deepfakes and the lag-ging traditional defense mechanisms,this paper establishes a novel active denial paradigm based on counter-competitive intelligence,offer-ing forward-looking strategic guidance for enterprises to disrupt attack chains at their source and reconstruct commercial security immune barriers in the indistinguishable truth from falsehood digital game.[Method]Utilizing evolutionary game theory from the perspective of counter-competitive intelligence,a game framework comprising enterprises,forgers,and regulatory bodies is constructed to examine their strategic behaviors in the context of deepfakes.By assessing the payoffs,costs,and losses associated with different behavioral strategies,the payoff matrices for the three parties are calculated,and then evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed,and the findings are substantiat-ed through numerical simulations.[Result/Conclusion]The research findings indicate that enterprises and regulatory agencies can jointly promote the evolution of anti-competitive intelligence-driven systems towards a mature stage by adopting proactive defense and strengthe-ning regulatory strategies,thereby forming a stable dynamic deterrence system.The improvement in the success rate of technical defense can significantly encourage enterprises to adopt proactive defense strategies.The imposition of two-way penalty constraints by regulatory agencies on both forgers and enterprises is a driving factor for achieving effective deterrence of deepfake content.
高国伟;林俞帆
辽宁师范大学数字政府与数据治理研究中心 大连 116081辽宁师范大学数字政府与数据治理研究中心 大连 116081
社会科学
反竞争情报深度伪造拒止三方演化博弈积极防御仿真分析
anti-competitive intelligencedeepfakesdenialtripartite evolutionary gameactive defensesimulated analysis
《情报杂志》 2026 (6)
37-46,10
辽宁省社会科学规划项目"政府与公民间政务数据可信性争议现象的发生机制与化解路径研究"(编号:L25BTQ002)研究成果.
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