农村养老产业PPP模式的动态演化博弈与协调机制研究OA

By introducing a strength coefficient for the traditional rural elderly care concept,this study constructs a tripartite dynamic evolutionary game model and employs a dual-scenario simulation method to systematically investigate the patterns of strategic interaction among multiple agents under different lev-els of this cultural concept.The findings reveal that efficient government guidance strengthens the positive investment preferences of urban capital flowing into rural areas,thereby encouraging farmer participation.However,active farmer participation,in turn,weakens the government's willingness to maintain efficient guidance.Under a low-intensity traditional care concept,farmers' willingness to participate is primarily driven by income thresholds.Conversely,under a high-intensity concept,policy intervention is required to overcome cultural lock-in and strictly control coordination costs;otherwise,it is prone to forming a difficult-to-reverse steady state of negative strategies.Rural-bound capital is sensitive to income incen-tives when the traditional concept intensity is low,but becomes more sensitive to service suitability and the absence of penalties when the intensity is high.In the latter case,regulatory failure can easily trigger short-term profit-seeking behavior.For the government,it is necessary to prevent efficiency losses from over-intervention under a low-intensity traditional concept,whereas under a high-intensity concept,cul-tural transformation must be combined with cost suppression,as a single policy tool is insufficient to main-tain a multi-party collaborative steady state.Consequently,based on the simulation results,this study constructs a collaborative mechanism encompassing farmer participation incentives,capital regulation con-straints,and dynamic government governance,providing theoretical support for the localized innovation of the rural elderly care industry.