碳排放权交易的政企演化博弈与实证研究OACHSSCD
Evolutionary Game and Empirical Study Government-Enterprise Interaction in Carbon Emission Trading:A Comprehensive Perspective Based on Technological Innovation and Emission Reduction Effects
在全球气候治理深化的背景下,中国碳规制体系正由传统命令型向以碳排放权交易为核心的市场型模式转型.为探究这一转型过程中市场型碳规制对企业低碳技术创新的影响机制与效果,构建政企演化博弈模型,结合碳市场实际数据,系统分析碳排放权交易机制引入前后政企的策略互动及其影响因素.基于2010-2024 年 A 股上市公司数据,运用双重差分模型进行实证检验.研究发现:碳排放权交易价格在政企博弈中发挥核心调节作用,能够向企业传递有效的市场信号与经济激励,驱动其低碳技术转型;碳排放权交易政策的实施显著提升了企业低碳技术创新水平,且这一促进效应对非重污染企业和高新技术企业尤为明显.为完善市场型碳规制、激励企业绿色创新提供了理论与实证参考.
In the context of the deepening global climate governance,China's carbon regulation system is undergoing a transformation from the traditional command-based model to a market-based model centered on carbon emission rights trading.To explore the mechanism and effect of market-based carbon regulation on enterprises' low-carbon technological innovation during this transformation process,this paper first constructs,based on actual data from the carbon market,a government-enterprise evolutionary game model,and systematically analyzes the strategic interactions between the government and enterprises before and after the introduction of the carbon emission rights trading mechanism,as well as the influencing factors.Then,using the difference-in-differences model based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2024,an empirical test is conducted.The study finds that the carbon emission rights trading price plays a core regulatory role in the government-enterprise game,conveys effective market signals and economic incentives to enterprises,and drives their low-carbon technological transformation;the implementation of the carbon emission rights trading policy significantly improves the level of enterprises' low-carbon technological innovation,and this promoting effect is particularly evident for non-polluting enterprises and high-tech enterprises.This research provides theoretical and empirical references for improving the market-based carbon regulation and stimulating enterprises' green innovation.
陈亚会;陈梦玫;迟远英
北京工业大学 经济与管理学院,北京 100124北京工业大学 经济与管理学院,北京 100124北京工业大学 经济与管理学院,北京 100124
管理科学
碳排放权交易市场异质性碳规制技术创新演化博弈双重差分
carbon emission trading marketheterogeneous carbon regulationtechnology innovationevolutionary game theorydifference-in-differences
《北京工业大学学报(社会科学版)》 2026 (3)
93-112,20
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(25YJCZH024)北京市教育委员会社科计划项目(SM202410005009)
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