环境补贴与环境规制双轮驱动下的工业企业绿色技术采纳决策OA

By analyzing the game relationship between the leading enterprises and the following enterprises,a three-stage global game model with uncertain interests of the game subjects is constructed to explore the impact of environmental subsidies and regulations on the adoption strategies of green technologies in industrial enterprises.By solving the Bayesian Nash equilibrium,the following conclusions can be drawn:moderate environmental subsidies can promote technology adoption,and subsidies should gradually decrease with the increase of voluntary adoption level;stricter environmental regulatory policies have a significantly positive impact on technology adoption;there is an interaction effect between environmental subsidies and technological complementarity,and well-designed subsidies can alleviate the adoption constraints of highly complementary industries;the credibility of policy signals directly determines whether enterprises can form a positive interaction between voluntary adoption and regulatory constraints;under the condition of strong first mover advantage,the uncertainty of technological benefits actually motivates leading enterprises to adopt green technologies first.Research has shown that incentive-based and command-based environmental policies do not always work independently.The government needs to combine industry characteristics and development stages,and collaboratively use multiple policy tools to effectively guide industrial enterprises to adopt green technologies.