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利益宣示与虚张声势:理解印度在中国周边地区的战略行为OACHSSCD

Interest Declaration and Bluffing:Understanding Strategic Behavior of India in the Periphery of China

中文摘要英文摘要

国家虚张声势是一种通过发出强势信号以达成特定目标的行为.本文引入传统政治学中的"假定利益"概念,建立了以政治学为理论支撑的假定利益与有效利益的分析框架,以此探讨国家虚张声势的动机来源与存在条件.有效利益是国家必须捍卫且投入了实质性资源的利益,假定利益则更多地服务于特定的战略目标.假定利益与有效利益构成的三种关系类型分别对应三种不同的对外政策,即韬光养晦、务实外交与虚张声势.其中,虚张声势是一国政府在语言上将假定利益作为有效利益进行宣示,但在执行上缺失实际投入的行为.通过虚张声势,国家在投入不足或者不投入行为的情况下,将假定利益转化为有效利益,从而实现其特定的战略意图.为验证上述理论框架,本文选择印度2014年后在中国重要周边——东亚地区的行为作为案例.印度在东亚外交中呈现出明显的虚张声势特征,其动机在于以较低成本增进有效利益:一方面缓和在南亚地区有效利益受损的战略焦虑;另一方面以较低成本增进自身在东亚地区的影响力.而印度虚张声势的环境条件是莫迪政府的国内观众成本较低,国际利益相关方不倾向于施加惩罚,以及相关话语在表面上不违背国际规范.在国际秩序转型期,印度加倍向"印太战略"靠拢是必然趋势,而国际社会中的虚张声势现象也将更加普遍.对于中国而言,分辨他国的假定利益和有效利益至关重要.在周边国家实施虚张声势与投机主义行为时,辨明这是对我国有效利益的侵蚀,还是以假定利益之名的投机搅局之举,是正确实施风险追加的前提.

State bluffing refers to the behavior of issuing strong signals to achieve specific objectives.By introducing the concept of"assumed interests"from traditional political science,this article establishes an analytical framework of assumed interests versus valid interests grounded in political theory to examine the motivational sources and existing conditions of state bluffing.Valid interests are those that a state must defend and has invested substantial resources in,whereas assumed interests primarily serve specific strategic objectives.The three relational types constituted by assumed and valid interests correspond to three distinct foreign policies:keeping a low profile,pragmatic diplomacy,and bluffing.Specifically,bluffing occurs when a government rhetorically declares assumed interests as valid interests while lacking actual investment in implementation.Through bluffing,a state converts assumed interests into valid interests without sufficient investment or with no investment at all,thereby achieving its specific strategic intentions.To validate the theoretical framework above,this article selects India's post-2014 behavior in East Asia—a crucial periphery of China—as a case study.India's East Asian diplomacy exhibits distinct characteristics of bluffing.Its motivations lie in enhancing valid interests at lower costs:on one hand,alleviating strategic anxiety arising from damaged valid interests in South Asia;on the other hand,increasing its influence in East Asia at relatively low cost.The environmental conditions enabling India's bluffing include:the Modi government's low domestic audience costs;the absence of international actors exposing or punishing India;and the superficial conformity of its rhetoric with international norms.During the international order transition period,India's intensified alignment with the"Indo-Pacific Strategy"represents an inevitable trend,and bluffing phenomena in international society will become more prevalent.For China,distinguishing other countries'assumed interests from valid interests is crucial.When peripheral states engage in bluffing and opportunistic behaviors,correctly identifying whether these actions erode China's valid interests or are merely opportunistic disturbances under the guise of assumed interests constitutes the prerequisite for proper risk escalation.

李铭恩

清华大学,北京 100084

社会科学

虚张声势国家利益信号传递中国周边地区印度

bluffingnational interestssignal transmissionthe periphery of ChinaIndia

《太平洋学报》 2026 (3)

17-30,14

本文系清华大学计算社会科学与国家治理实验室重大研究项目"中国海外安全风险预测与预警系统"的阶段性研究成果.

10.14015/j.cnki.1004-8049.2026.03.002

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