森林保险费率改革的演化博弈分析OACHSSCD

⑴ Background——As a key system for diversifying forestry operation risks,forest insurance has played an important safeguard role.However,the long-standing unified premium rate mechanism implemented in China has exhibited certain rigidity,which has led to structural contradictions characterized by high subsidies,low insur-ance participation rates and low compensation payout rates.Nevertheless,due to the trade-off between costs and benefits and the mismatch between policy supports and market responses,the two parties engage in strategic in-teractions,and their interplay has become the key to the successful implementation of the reform. ⑵ Methods——Based on the evolutionary game theory,this paper first constructed a dynamic evolutionary game model and analyzed five equilibrium states—reform stagnation,market dominance,policy inaction,govern-ment-insurance coordination,and path dependence—along with their evolutionary trajectories and stability condi-tions.Then,it explored the structural imbalances and the misalignment between policies and insurance practices caused by the unified pricing of forest insurance.Finally,it deeply analyzed the decision-making logic and inter-active relationship between local governments and insurance companies in the market-oriented reform of forest in-surance premium rates,as well as their impacts on market efficiency. ⑶ Results——First,the advancement of forest insurance premium rate reform is not the result of inde-pendent decision-making by a single entity,but a dynamical evolutionary process where local governments and insurance companies conduct cost-benefit analyses under the constraints of bounded rationality and information a-symmetry.Second,a positive equilibrium of collaborative advancement between local governments and insurance companies can only be achieved when the policy supports provided by local governments can effectively cover the reform costs and potential risks of insurance companies,and when the premium rate reform can generate long-term and sustainable benefits for both parties.Third,the evolutionary process of forest insurance premium rate re-form exhibits a significant path dependence effect of initial strategy.The key to driving the system to converge to-ward the optimal collaborative state lies in strengthening the credibility of local governments'policy commitments and reducing the uncertainty of the reform. ⑷ Conclusions and Discussions——First,optimize the collaborative trigger mechanism between the gov-ernment and insurance institutions.The government can issue clear pilot policies,timetables and supporting re-sources(such as special funds and data interfaces).Encourage and authorize qualified insurance institutions to prioritize the implementation of differentiated premium rates in pilot areas.Second,establish an institutionalized risk hedging and commitment guarantee mechanism.Set up a"premium rate reform risk compensation fund",build a rigid constraint framework for policy commitments,clarify the validity period of policies,adjust the ad-vance notice procedures and breach liability clauses,and disclose regulatory rules and technical standards.Third,improve the incentive-compatible system between local governments and insurance institutions.Incorporate indicators such as forest insurance coverage rate and forest risk mitigation management into the policy assessment system.Uniformly issue standardized operation guidelines and build a forest insurance industry data sharing plat-form to reduce the compliance costs and technological inputs of insurance institutions.