首页|期刊导航|技术与创新管理|多主体参与视角下新能源汽车异质性政策组合效应的演化博弈研究

多主体参与视角下新能源汽车异质性政策组合效应的演化博弈研究OACHSSCD

An Evolutionary Game Study on the Effects of Heterogeneous Policy Portfolios for New Energy Vehicles from a Multi-Actor Participation Perspective

中文摘要英文摘要

为系统评估新能源汽车异质性政策组合的协同效应,选取了五类典型的政策工具,即新能源汽车财政补贴、双积分、购置税减免、配套设施建设和不限行政策,设计了一个涵盖政策组合情景、演化博弈分析、系统动力学建模仿真以及敏感性分析研究的综合分析框架,分析政府、汽车生产商与消费者在不同政策作用下的策略演化过程.研究结果表明,单一或缺乏协同的政策难以有效支撑新能源汽车市场的可持续发展,生产端与消费端的政策协同能够显著提升产业活力;多政策组合尤其是包含配套设施建设的方案,有助于形成良性循环,但在投入强度上存在最优阈值.研究有助于揭示新能源汽车多维政策的协同机制,为构建结构优化、效能均衡的政策体系提供理论依据和决策支持.

To systematically evaluate the synergistic effects of heterogeneous policy portfolios in the new energy vehicle(NEV)industry,this study selects five representative policy instruments-financial subsi-dies for NEVs,the dual-credit policy,purchase tax exemptions,charging infrastructure construction,and traffic privilege policies.A comprehensive analytical framework is developed,integrating policy scenario design,evolutionary game analysis,system dynamics simulation,and sensitivity analysis to examine the strategic evolution of governments,automakers,and consumers under different policy interventions.The results indicate that single or non-coordinated policies are insufficient to support the sustainable devel-opment of the NEV market,whereas the synergy between production-side and consumption-side policies can significantly enhance industrial vitality.Multi-policy portfolios,particularly those incorporating in-frastructure construction,help create positive feedback loops and improve system stability,although the effectiveness of such policies is subject to optimal thresholds in investment intensity.This research con-tributes to understanding the coordination mechanisms among multidimensional NEV policies and pro-vides theoretical foundations and decision support for designing more balanced,efficient,and structural-ly optimized policy systems.

王璐瑶;张振涛

西安建筑科技大学管理学院,陕西西安 710055西安建筑科技大学管理学院,陕西西安 710055

管理科学

新能源汽车政策工具异质性政策组合三方演化博弈系统动力学

new energy vehiclespolicy instrumentsheterogeneous policy combinationstripartite evo-lutionary gamesystem dynamics

《技术与创新管理》 2026 (2)

187-201,15

国家自然科学基金青年项目(72202168)

10.14090/j.cnki.jscx.2026.0207

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