高速公路噪声防治参与主体博弈策略研究OA

To uncover the decision-making mechanisms and evolutionary dynamics of multiple stakeholders in highway noise pollution control,a three-party evolutionary game model involving the government,operators,and the public is constructed.The operation period is divided into different stages for differentiated analysis.A simulation analysis was performed on the Lituo sinking section of the Beijing-Hong Kong-Macao Highway to assess the impact of variations in critical elements on the system.The results indicate that the Lituo sinking section of the Beijing-Hong Kong-Macao Highway is currently in its early stage of development,with the corresponding strategies being active regulation,exces-sive emissions,and supervision.When the cost of the gov-ernment's active regulation decreases from 1×105 to 5×104 yuan,the system converges more rapidly toward the active regulation strategy.When the cost of the operator's exces-sive emissions increases from 14.08×106 to 20.00×106 yuan,the system drives the operator toward the standard-ized emission strategy.In addition,when the cost of public supervision decreases from 15×104 to 5×104 yuan and the compensation paid by operators to the public increases from 1.288×106 to 2.576×106 yuan,the system converges more quickly toward the supervision strategy.The cost of the op-erator's excessive emissions serves as the core decision vari-able for achieving the ideal equilibrium in the three-party game involving government active regulation,operator stan-dardized emissions,and public supervision.